98-2: Global Climate Change Treaty: The Kyoto
Protocol
Susan R. Fletcher
Senior Analyst in International
Environmental Policy
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
Updated March 6, 2000
Summary
Negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) were completed December 11, 1997, committing the
industrialized nations to specified, legally binding reductions in emissions of six
"greenhouse gases." The treaty was opened for signature on March 16, 1998
through March 16, 1999; the United States signed the Protocol on November 12, 1998. This
treaty would commit the United States to a target of reducing greenhouse gases by 7% below
1990 levels during a "commitment period" between 2008-2012. Because of the way
sinks, which remove these gases from the atmosphere, are counted and because of other
provisions discussed in this report, the actual reduction of emissions within the United
States required to meet the target is estimated to be lower than 7%. The Administration
has indicated that until developing countries also make commitments to participate in
greenhouse gas limitations, it will not submit the protocol to the Senate for advice and
consent, thereby delaying indefinitely any possibility of ratification. At the November
1998 meeting of the parties in Buenos Aires, Argentina, some of the more difficult
unresolved issues were discussed but not resolved; instead, workplans were agreed upon for
a number of these issues, with deadlines for completion by the sixth Conference of the
Parties (COP-6) to be held in The Hague, Netherlands, November 13-24, 2000. In the 106th
Congress, several bills, resolutions and provisions in appropriations bills have been
introduced, some to limit activities of the U.S. government that are or could be seen as
related to carrying out the goals of the Kyoto Protocol, and others on such subjects as
early credit for greenhouse gas emission reductions.
Background. Responding to concerns that human
activities are increasing concentrations of "greenhouse gases" (such as carbon
dioxide and methane) in the atmosphere, most nations of the world joined together in 1992
to sign the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The United
States was one of the first nations to ratify this treaty. It included a legally
non-binding, voluntary pledge that the major industrialized/developed nations would reduce
their greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000. However, as scientific
consensus grew that human activities are having a discernible impact on global climate
systems, possibly causing a warming of the Earth that could result in significant impacts
such as sea level rise, changes in weather patterns and health effects--and as it became
apparent that major nations such as the United States and Japan would not meet the
voluntary stabilization target by 2000--Parties to the treaty decided in 1995 to enter
into negotiations on a protocol to establish legally binding limitations or reductions in
greenhouse gas emissions. It was decided by the Parties that this round of negotiations
would establish limitations only for the developed countries (those listed in Annex I to
the UNFCCC, including the former Communist countries, and referred to as "Annex I
countries." Developing countries are referred to as "non-Annex I
countries").(1)
During negotiations that preceded the December 1-11, 1997, meeting
in Kyoto, Japan, little progress was made, and the most difficult issues were not resolved
until the final days--and hours--of the Conference. There was wide disparity among key
players especially on three items: (1) the amount of binding reductions in greenhouse
gases to be required, and the gases to be included in these requirements; (2) whether
developing countries should be part of the requirements for greenhouse gas limitations;
and (3) whether to allow emissions trading and joint implementation, which allow credit to
be given for emissions reductions to a country that provides funding or investments in
other countries that bring about the actual reductions in those other countries or
locations where they may be cheaper to attain.
Following completion of the Protocol in December of 1997, details of
a number of the more difficult issues remained to be negotiated and resolved (see below).
At the fourth Conference of the Parties (COP-4) held November 2-13, 1998, in Buenos Aires,
Argentina, it was apparent that these issues could not be resolved as had been expected
during this meeting. Instead, parties established a two-year "Buenos Aires action
plan" to deal with these issues, with a deadline for completion now set at the end of
2000 or in early 2001--at COP-6 . Elements of this action plan are summarized below.
Summary: Major Provisions of the Kyoto Protocol.
The Kyoto Protocol was opened for signature March 16, 1998, for one year, and would enter
into force when 55 nations have ratified it, provided that these ratifications include
Annex I Parties that account for at least 55% of total carbon dioxide emissions in 1990.
This provision is likely to be hard to meet in the absence of U.S. ratification. On
November 12, 1998, the United States signed the Protocol, in part because the Clinton
Administration wanted to revitalize what was seen as some loss of momentum during COP-4.
As of February, 2000, 84 countries had signed the treaty, including the European Union and
most of its members, Canada, Japan, China, and a range of developing countries. Some 22
countries were reported by the UNFCCC Secretariat to have ratified the treaty. Nations are
not subject to its commitments unless they have ratified it and it enters into force.
The major commitments in the treaty on the most controversial issues
are as follows:
Emissions Reductions. The United States
would be obligated under the Protocol to a cumulative reduction in its greenhouse gas
emissions of 7% below 1990 levels for three greenhouse gases (including carbon dioxide),
and below 1995 levels for the three man-made gases, averaged over the commitment period
2008 to 2012. The Protocol states that Annex I Parties are committed--individually or
jointly--to ensuring that their aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent
emissions of greenhouse gases do not exceed amounts assigned to each country in Annex B to
the Protocol, "with a view to reducing their overall emissions of such gases by at
least 5% below 1990 levels in the commitment period 2008 to 2012." Annex A lists the
6 major greenhouse gases covered by the treaty(2).
Annex B lists 39 nations, including the United States, the European
Union plus the individual EU nations, Japan, and many of the former Communist nations. The
amounts for each country are listed as percentages of the base year, 1990 (except for some
former Communist countries), and range from 92% (a reduction of 8%) for most European
countries--to 110% (an increase of 10%) for Iceland. The United States is committed on
this list to 93%, or a reduction of 7%, to be achieved as an average over the 5 years
2008-2012.
Based on projections of the growth of emissions using current
technologies and processes, the reduction in greenhouse gas emissions required of the
United States would likely be between 20% and 30% below where it would be otherwise by the
2008-2012 budget period.(3) However,
according to Administration officials, based on the accounting method adopted in the
Protocol, which includes (as the United States had urged) greenhouse gas sinks, it appears
that the actions that must be taken to reduce emissions within the United States, after
sinks are counted, would be substantially less than 7%--probably in the range of 2 to 3%
below 1990 levels. The Administration also is assuming that a significant portion of its
7% target could be met through some combination of emissions trading and joint
implementation.
Developing Country Responsibilities. The
United States had taken a firm position that "meaningful participation" of
developing countries in commitments made in the Protocol is critical both to achieving the
goals of the treaty and to its approval by the U.S. Senate. This reflects the requirement
articulated in S.Res. 98,
passed in mid-1997, that the United States should not become a party to the Kyoto Protocol
until developing countries are subject to binding emissions targets. The U.S. government
also argued that success in dealing with the issue of climate change and global warming
would require such participation. The developing country bloc argued that the Berlin
Mandate--the terms of reference of the Kyoto negotiations--clearly excluded them from new
commitments in this Protocol, and they continued to oppose emissions limitation
commitments by non-Annex I countries. The negotiations concluded without such commitments,
and the United States indicated that it will not submit the Protocol for Senate
consideration--and therefore will not be able to ratify it--until meaningful commitments
are made by developing countries.
At the COP-4 in Buenos Aires, Argentina became the first nation to
indicate that it will make a commitment to take on a binding emissions target for the
period 2008-2012. Kazakhstan also announced its intention to take similar action. It was
immediately after these announcements that the United States signed the Kyoto Protocol.
However, it is unclear exactly what emissions limitations Argentina will undertake, and
how many other developing countries--particularly key large greenhouse gas emitting
nations such as China, India and Brazil--will make similar commitments.
The Protocol does call on all Parties--developed and developing--to
take a number of steps to formulate national and regional programs to improve "local
emission factors," activity data, models, and national inventories of greenhouse gas
emissions and sinks that remove these gases from the atmosphere. All Parties are also
committed to formulate, publish, and update climate change mitigation and adaptation
measures, and to cooperate in promotion and transfer of environmentally sound technologies
and in scientific and technical research on the climate system.
Emissions Trading and Joint Implementation.
Emissions trading, in which a Party included in Annex I "may transfer to, or acquire
from, any other such Party emission reduction units resulting from projects aimed at
reducing anthropogenic emissions by sources or enhancing anthropogenic removals by sinks
of greenhouse gases" for the purpose of meeting its commitments under the treaty, is
allowed and outlined in Article 6, with several provisos. Among the provisos is the
requirement that such trading "shall be supplemental to domestic actions." The
purpose of this proviso is to make it clear that a nation cannot entirely fulfill its
responsibility to reduce domestic emissions by relying primarily on emissions trading or
joint implementation to meet its targets. Joint implementation is project-based
activity in which one country can receive emission reduction credits when it funds a
project in another country where the emissions are actually reduced.
A number of specific issues related to the rules on how joint
implementation and emissions trading would work are to be negotiated and resolved in
subsequent meetings, as these issues are clarified and identified. In the year since the
Protocol was completed, it became increasingly clear that this is an extremely complex
issue, and an emissions trading system is not likely to be designed and implemented
quickly. This will be a major element of the Buenos Aires action plan over the next 2
years.
A major development is the establishment of a "clean
development mechanism" (CDM), through which joint implementation between developed
and developing countries would occur. The United States had pushed hard for joint
implementation, and early proposals were formulated with the expectation that
"JI" projects would be primarily bilateral. Instead, negotiations resulted in
agreement to establish the clean development mechanism to which developed Annex I
countries could contribute financially, and developing non-Annex I countries could benefit
from financing for approved project activities; Annex I countries could then use certified
emission reductions from such projects to contribute to their compliance with part of
their emission limitation commitment. Emissions reductions achieved through this mechanism
could begin in the year 2000 to count toward compliance in the first commitment period
(2008-2012). Again, proposals on how this mechanism would operate will be developed and
negotiated under the Buenos Aires action plan. Like emissions trading, making the CDM
operational appears likely to be a protracted and difficult process, given the increasing
number of complexities emerging from the on-going work and discussions on how the CDM
might work.
Buenos Aires Action Plan: Summary. Although it had
been expected just after the 1997 Kyoto conference that the November 1998 COP-4 meeting in
Buenos Aires would negotiate and begin to resolve some of the more difficult issues left
unresolved in Kyoto, it became clear during the year leading up to COP-4 that parties were
far from agreement on all of these issues. Additional time for parties to analyze,
negotiate, and work on these issues would be required. Therefore, the parties arrived in
Buenos Aires with an agenda focused on formulating an "action plan" that would
allow for the needed additional work to be done. It was decided that the work plan would
be completed by the end of 2000, and would focus on the key issues, including the
following:
-- Rules and guidelines for the "market-based mechanisms"
that allow flexibility to parties in meeting their obligations. These include emissions
trading, joint implementation, and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The list of
critical operational issues to be considered include "transparency" in making it
possible to effectively track emission units; allocating risk in emissions
trades--including the question of assigning liability, or responsibility, when emissions
trading involves "false" credits; and key measurement, reporting and
verification issues.
-- Rules and procedures that would govern compliance, including
provisions covering non-compliance with the treaty's commitments. This issue was left
entirely open at Kyoto and is one of the major challenges facing negotiators.
-- Issues concerning development and transfer of cleaner,
lower-emitting technologies, particularly to developing countries;
-- Consideration of the adverse impacts of climate change and also
the impacts of measures taken to respond to it.
Another issue under active negotiation and consideration by the
parties outside the action plan itself is defining carbon sinks, including how to measure
and verify the categories of carbon sinks. The scientific panel that provides analysis to
the parties, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), is to conduct a
comprehensive study on land use, land-use change, and forestry activities to identify
their roles as carbon sinks and deal with the measurement and verification issues related
to them. The IPCC report is due in the spring of 2000, and is expected to contribute to
further decisions on the use and scope of carbon sinks in meeting obligations under the
Kyoto Protocol.
Few decisions were reached on the more difficult issues outlined in
the Buenos Aires Plan of Action at the COP-5 meeting in Bonn, Germany, held October
25-November 24, 1999. The COP-6 meeting, by which the Buenos Aires Plan of Action is
scheduled to be completed, is scheduled for November 13-24, 2000, in The Hague,
Netherlands. It will be preceded by two rounds of talks, June 12-16 and September 11-15,
2000, as well as by continuing informal discussions and negotiations.
Issues for Congress
Ratification. For the United States to
ratify the Protocol, the treaty must be submitted to the U.S. Senate for advice and
consent, with a two-thirds majority vote in the Senate required for approval. If the
United States does not ratify the treaty, it is not subject to its terms and obligations.
President Clinton has voiced strong support for the Kyoto Protocol, though criticizing it
for not including commitments for developing countries. The United States signed it on
November 12, 1998. The U.S. signature was criticized by several Members of Congress who
oppose the treaty on a number of grounds, including questions about the scientific
justification for it and about the likely economic impacts that might occur if the United
States were to attempt to meet its emission reduction commitments in the treaty. In
recognition of the opposition expressed in the Senate by S.Res. 98, which passed
95-0, to a Protocol that does not include requirements for emissions limitations by
developing countries, the President has indicated that he will not submit the treaty to
the Senate for advice and consent until meaningful developing country participation has
been achieved.
Oversight. Both the House and Senate sent
delegations of Members to serve as observers on the U.S. delegation to the Kyoto meeting,
as well as to other COP meetings, including the November 1998 COP-4 meeting in Buenos
Aires. Supporters and opponents of the Protocol were included in these delegations. A
number of committees have held hearings on the implications of the Protocol for the United
States, its economy, energy prices, impacts on climate change, and other related issues.
While the Administration has stated that it believes the treaty can be implemented without
harm to the U.S. economy, and without imposing additional taxes, a number of questions
related to how its goals can be achieved and at what cost, continue to be of interest to
Congress.
Legislation. If a treaty is sent to the
Senate for consideration, legislation that might be required for its implementation would
also typically be proposed and introduced. Such legislation would not be likely unless the
Kyoto Protocol is sent to Congress. However, the President's proposal on climate change,
announced in October 1998, included, among other things, a $5 billion package of tax
credits and spending on research and development over 5 years to encourage energy
efficiency and development of new lower emission technologies. In subsequent budget
proposals, the President has offered an initiative over multiple years of $6.3 billion
dollars for research and development and some possible tax incentives. A number of
legislative proposals in the 105th and 106th Congresses--including
bills, resolutions, and provisions in several appropriations bills-- have expressed
concerns related to the Kyoto Protocol. Many of these would have limited activities of the
U.S. government that might be seen to advance the goals of the Kyoto Protocol prior to its
consideration by the Senate. Others would provide early credit for greenhouse gas
emissions in the United States (see "Legislation" Section of the CRS Global Climate Change Electronic
Briefing Book.
Footnotes
1. (back)For
additional information on the negotiations in Kyoto and related background, see CRS Report
97-1000, Global Climate Change Treaty: Negotiations and Related
Issues; and CRS Issue Brief IB89005, Global Climate
Change.
2. (back)The six
gases covered by the Protocol are carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4),
nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and
sulphur hexafluoride (SF6). The most prominent of these, and the most pervasive
in human economic activity is carbon dioxide, produced when wood or fossil fuels such as
oil, coal, and gas are burned.
3. (back)See CRS Report 98-235 ENR, Reducing
Greenhouse Gases: How Much from What Baseline?
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