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Superfund Fact Book Table of Contents for this Section De Minimis
Settlements Health Issues and the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry
Endnotes
Table 7. Five Largest Natural Resource Damage Settlements at
Superfund Sites as of July 1995
Figure 6. Public Health Assessments of Superfund Sites from 1993-1995 De minimis parties are PRPs that are responsible for a minor share of the total cleanup costs at a site and that have contributed minimally to the volume or toxic effects of hazardous waste at a site compared to other PRPs. CERCLA authorizes EPA to enter into expedited settlements with de minimis parties and encourages EPA to do so t'as promptly as possible." 66 CERCLA authorizes de minimis settlements in situations where a party is the owner of the property where the facility is located but did not conduct or permit the generation, handling or disposal of hazardous substances at the facility; did not contribute to the release or threatened release from the facility; and did not acquire the facility with knowledge that it had been used to store, handle or dispose of hazardous substances.67 De minimis settlements can reduce EPA's administrative and judicial enforcement activities at a site by obtaining expedited cash payments for cleanup costs without resorting to extensive litigation, and can benefit small volume contributors by removing them from further liability and protecting them from litigation by other PRPs.68 "De micromis" settlements are a subset of de minimis settlements and are available to PRPs whose contribution to a hazardous release is a "minuscule" amount, less than the '1minimal" amount contributed by de minimis parties. "De micromis" settlements are available to generators and transporters of waste but are not available to owners or operators of sites. Like de minimis settlements, "de micromis" settlements also remove PRPs from further liability and protect them from litigation by other PRPs. Whereas de minimis settlements do require PRPs to pay a small portion of the total cleanup costs at a site, de micromis settlements completely remove PRPs from financial liability.69
Under CERCLA's joint and several liability standards, financially viable PRPs are responsible for paying the cleanup costs of defunct or financially insolvent PRPs. The share of the costs for a non-viable PRP is referred to as an orphan share.76
CERCLA makes PRPs liable for the costs of restoring natural resources that are damaged or lost due to a hazardous substances release and for the costs of assessing these damages or losses.79 Federal, state, and Indian tribal authorities act on behalf of the public as trustees to assess damages at contaminated sites and to prepare damage claims.80 According to the Department of Justice, federal trustees can seek payments for claims only if damage remains after the cleanup of a CERCLA site is complete. The federal trustees settle almost half of the damage claims without requiring separate payments for natural resource damages because the initial cleanup frequently repairs the damage.81
Table
7. Five Largest
Natural les'ource Damage
Source: GAO. Outlook for and Experience with Natural Resource Damage Settlements. GAO/RCED-96-71. April 1996. p.8.
EPA's survey of NPL site managers in 1994 indicated that industrial use is the most common activity on Superfund sites. However, residential use occurs most frequently in the areas surrounding a site. Educational use ranks the lowest among the major land uses. Table 8 lists the major types of land use that occur on Superfund sites and in the areas surrounding them. Table 8. On-Site and Surrounding Land Uses at Superfund Sites
"Other" includes closed landfills, mihtaty lands, undeveloped lands, wetlands, and other wildlife habitats. Note: Of the 1,249 final and deleted Superfund sites at the time of the survey in 1994 (123 federal facilities and 1,126 non-federal sites), on-site land uses reflect data from 1,247 sites reporting while surrounding land uses reflect data from 1,245 sites reporting. Totals for land use exceed the number of Superfund sites because of multiple uses at certain sites. Source: EPA. OSWER. Survey of NPL Site Managers. Januaiy 28,1994. Health Issues and the Agency for CERCLA created a new public health agency, the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR), to investigate the impacts of hazardous substance releases on public health and to take public health interventions. As amended in 1986, CERCLA requires the ATSDR to conduct public health assessments of all Superfund sites proposed for the NPL and for other hazardous waste sites in response to public petitions. CERCLA also requires the ATSDR to establish a priority list of hazardous substances found most often at Superfund sites, to produce toxicological profiles for each substance on this list, to initiate research to fill toxicologic gaps for priority substances, to conduct epidemiology and surveillance, to establish a national registry of persons exposed to hazardous substances, and to provide training and ducation for physicians. Although the ATSDR is a separate agency within the U.S. Public Health Service, the Superfund program provides funding for the agency's annual operating budget.
Public Health Assessments
Prepared by CRS with data from the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry.
Overall Assessment of Public Health Impact
The state role at Superfund sites can range from sharing cleanup costs at federally funded cleanups (as required by GERCLA) to actively managing a site. Of the nearly 13,000 CERCLIS sites, roughly 90% are not on the NPL. At these non-NPL sites, the federal role may be limited to cleanup assessment or emergency remedial activities, or the federal government may not be involved at all. There also are other potentially hazardous sites that are not included in CERCLIS. State superfund programs have the authority to assess and clean up non-NPL sites listed in CERCLIS and to identify other potentially hazardous sites for cleanup in their jurisdictions.86
Table
9. Common Sources of
Funding
Source: Environmental Law Institute (ELI). An Analysis of State Superfund Programs: 50-State Study, 1995 Update. Washington, 1996. 293 p. ELI Project #941724.
A study of five European countries and Canada indicated that a significant number of potentially contaminated sites may warrant cleanup activities, ranging from as many as 250,000 in Germany to 500 in Denmark. Some of these countries have made substantial progress in identifying and assessing these sites, while others have just begun. Compared to the United States, the study concluded that these countries have a less comprehensive process to characterize potentially hazardous sites and less stringent standards to determine and enforce a party's liability for a hazardous release.94 Austria has identified about 7,000 potentially hazardous sites and estimates that the cost to clean them up will be roughly $2 billion. The national and state governments are authorized to require responsible parties to conduct or finance cleanup activities. The national government funds unrecoverable cleanup costs through a $16/ton tax on industrial hazardous waste generation and a $3.30/ton tax on nonhazardous industrial waste generation. Within their jurisdictions, the provincial governments identify, assess, and clean up the majority of potentially hazardous sites across the country. The National Contaminated Sites Remediation Program evaluates sites where a responsible party cannot be identified or where the site owner is financially unable to pay the cleanup costs. Environment Canada, the national environmental agency, is responsible for identifying and assessing potentially hazardous sites on publicly owned land. (Roughly 40% of Canada is publicly owned land.) As of March 31, 1994, Environment Canada had identified and assessed 231 sites and begun cleanup activities at 11 of these sites. General tax revenues finance cleanup costs, and the national and provincial governments divide these costs evenly. Canada does not collect fees or taxes on hazardous waste generation to finance cleanup costs. There are roughly 500 potentially hazardous sites in Denmark. The total cost to assess and clean up these sites could range between $1 and $3 billion. Responsible parties are required to pay for cleanup costs, and private property owners must certify that a site is clean before developing it. However, the national and county governments pay for cleanup costs at sites where a responsible party is financially insolvent. There are roughly 250,000 potentially hazardous sites in Germany, including 14,000 military sites. The total cost to identify, assess, and clean up these sites could reach $260 billion. Current cleanup expenditures are nearly $4 billion annually. Whenever possible, Germany enforces liability for contamination. However, the Unification Treaty between West and East Germany exempts investors from liability who acquired sites in the former East Germany where the contamination occurred before July 1, 1990. The national government pays 60% of the cleanup costs, and the German states pay the remainder. The German states are authorized to develop tax revenue structures to finance cleanup costs. Some states collect fees or taxes on waste generation and ground water use to finance cleanup costs. There are roughly 110,000 potentially hazardous sites in the Netherlands. The total cost to clean up these sites could reach $25 billion. Cleanup activities are complete at more than 1,000 sites. General tax revenues initially finance cleanup costs. However, the national government recovers these costs from the responsible parties after cleaning up a site. There are roughly 8,000 potentially hazardous sites in Sweden, of which 4,000 are municipal waste disposal sites. General tax revenues finance most cleanup costs because the country's liability laws limit recovering these costs from responsible parties. Targeted tax revenues to finance cleanup costs through taxes on hazardous and nonhazardous waste disposal have been proposed but rejected. In addition to the above countries, Mexico also has a hazardous waste program, which it announced on October 9, 1996. The new program will establish information requirements for government and industry, revise hazardous waste regulations, promote cooperation between government and industry, and identify sites for waste confinement and treatment. The national government reports that the country's industry produces 8 million tons of hazardous waste annually and that 88% of this waste is disposed unsafely or illegally. The new program has compiled an inventory of 55 sites that potentially warrant cleanup. These sites are located in central Mexico and represent about 65% of the country's hazardous waste. The national government expects to construct at least four hazardous waste confinement and processing facilities to clean up these sites. 66 42 U.S.C. 9622(g). "De Minimis Settlements." 67 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9622(g)(1)(B). 68 EPA. Office of Site Remediation and Enforcement. Revised De Minirnis Contributor Consent Decree. EPA Memorandum. September 29, 1995. 69 EPA. Office of Site Remediation and Enforcement. Revised Guidance on CERCLA Settlements with De Micromis Waste Contributors. EPA Memorandum. June 3, 1996. 70 GAO. Superfund & Number of Potentially Responsible Parties at Superfund Sites is Difficult to Determine. GAO/RCED-96-75. March 1996. p.4. 71 Ibid., p.4. The data were reported in ranges for each site: 0,1, 2-10, 11-50, 51-100, 101-500, 501-1,000, and more than 1,000 de minimis parties. GAO reached its estimate by using the low and high ends of each range. 72 Ibid. 73 Ibid. 74 EPA. The First 125 De Minimis Settlements. October 1993. p.3. 75 EPA. Superfund Administrative Reforms Annual Report, Fi8ca1 Year 1996. December1996. p. vi'. 76 EPA. Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance. Interim Guidance on Orphan Share Compensation for Settlors of Remedial Design/Remedial Action and Non-Time-Critical Removals. EPA Memorandum. June 3, 1996. 77 Ibid. 78 EPA. OSWER. Mixed Funding Evaluation Report. The Potential Costs of Orphan Share8. September 1998. 79 42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(4)(C). "Liability." 80 42 U.S.C. 9607(f). "Natural resources liability; designation of public trustees of natural resources." 81 GAO. Outlook for and Experience with Natural Resource Damage Settlements. GAO~CED-96-7l. April 1996. p.4-5. 82 Ibid., p.5. 83 Ibid,. p. 6 84 Environmental Law Institute. An Analysis of State Superfund Programs: 50-State Study, 1995 Update. ELI Project #941724. p.46. 85 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry. Report to Congress: 1993, 1994, 1995. 1996. 68 p. 86 Environmental Law Institute (ELI). An Analysis of
State Superfund Pogram8:50-State Study, 1995 Update. Washington,
1996.293 p. ELI Project #941724. 87 Ibid., p.10. 88 Ibid., p. 67-69. 89 Ibid., p.67-69. 90 Ibid., p.81-85. 91 Ibid., p.41-44. 92 Ibid., p 35. 93 Ibid., p.70. 94 "New Alternatives Advanced for Financing Site Remediation," The Hazardous Waste Consultant. vol.13, no.2. March/April 1995. p.1.13-1.15. 95 Ibid. 96 Ibid. 97 Ibid. 98 Ibid 99 Ibid. 100 Ibid. 101 "Mexico: Hazardous Waste Program Announced; Inventory Covers Zones for Treatment Units," Daily Environment Report. October 15,1996 (no.199). p. AA-1. |
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