IB93108: Central Asia's New States: Political Developments
and Implications for U.S. Interests

Jim Nichol

Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

March 31, 2000

CONTENTS

• SUMMARY
• MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
• BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
• Historical Background
• Overview of U.S. Policy Concerns
• U.S. Policy after the Soviet Collapse
• Fostering Pro-western Orientations
• Russia's Role
• Obstacles to Peace and Independence
• Regional Tensions and Conflicts
• Democratization and Human Rights
• Recent Tajik Elections
• Recent Kazakh Elections
• Recent Turkmen Elections
• Recent Uzbek Elections
• Recent Kyrgyz Elections
• Security and Arms Control
• Support for Economic Reforms
• Trade and Investment
• Energy Resources
• Aid Overview

MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Underlining increased U.S. concern about Central Asia's security and stability, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet, Federal Bureau of Investigations Director Louis Freeh, and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright are heading delegations visiting the region in late March and April, 2000. Director Tenet is visiting Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan on March 28-30. Director Freeh will visit Kazakhstan on April 7-8 to discuss counter-terrorism, anti-narcotics, and international crime control cooperation, and to inaugurate a legal attache's office at the U.S. Embassy in Almaty. Secretary Albright's first visit to the region on April 14-20 will focus on democratization, human rights, economic reforms, and security issues in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. Of major U.S. concern are terrorist bombings in Uzbekistan, terrorist incursions into Kyrgyzstan, and other aspects of Islamic extremism destabilizing the region, according to the State Department.

On March 26, 2000, Tajikistan disbanded its National Reconciliation Commission (NRC), created to implement 1997 peace accords ending the civil war. The accords set legislative elections held in March as the culmination of the peace process. Former rebel Seyed Abdullo Nuri, chairman of the NRC, called for quick settlement of remaining peace issues. The U.N. Security Council on March 21 praised the legislative elections and work of the NRC, and supported withdrawing U.N. observers in May 2000.

BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS

Historical Background

Central Asia consists of the former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz-stan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uz-bekistan, and borders Russia, China, the Middle East, and South Asia. The major peoples of all but Tajikistan speak Turkic languages (the Tajiks speak an Iranian language), and most are Sunni Muslims (some Tajiks are Shiia Muslims). Most are closely related historically and cultur-ally. By the late 19th century, Russian Tsars had conquered the last independent khanates and nomadic lands of Central Asia. After the breakup of the Tsarist empire, Central Asia was at first included within Soviet Russia, but by 1936 five "union republics" had been delineated. Soviet communist rule resulted in massive loss of life from collectivization and purges, though economic development occurred. Upon the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the five republics gained worldwide diplomatic recognition. (For overviews, see CRS Reports 97-1058, Kazakhstan; 97-690, Kyrgyzstan; 98-594, Tajikistan; 97-1055, Turkmenistan; and 97-1060, Uzbekistan, updated regularly).

Overview of U.S. Policy Concerns

The major goals of U.S. policy toward the NIS, including Central Asia, entail fostering stability, democratization, free market economies and trade, denuclearization in the non-Russian states, and adherence to international human rights standards. These positive goals of U.S. policy are supported by another priority of U.S. policy -- to discourage attempts by radical regimes and groups to block or subvert progress toward these goals or otherwise threaten regional and international peace and stability. While a consensus appears to exist among most U.S. policymakers and others on the general desirability of these goals, others urge different emphases or levels of U.S. involvement. Many of those who endorse current policy or urge enhanced U.S. aid for Central Asia support the view that political instability in Central Asia can produce spillover effects in important nearby states, including U.S. allies and friends such as Turkey. They also point out that the United States has a major interest in preventing terrorist regimes or organizations from illicitly acquiring nuclear weapons-related materials and technology from the region. They maintain that U.S. interests do not perfectly coincide with those of its allies and friends, that Turkey and other actors possess limited aid resources, and that the United States is in the strongest position as a superpower to influence democratization and respect for human rights in these new states. They stress that U.S. leadership in world efforts to provide humanitarian and economic development aid will assist in alleviating the high levels of social distress in the region, distress that is exploited by anti-Western Islamic fundamentalist movements seeking new members. Although many U.S. policymakers acknowledge a role for a democratizing Russia in the region, they stress that U.S. and other Western aid and investment strengthen the independence of the states and forestall Russian attempts to re-subjugate the region.

Those who object to current U.S. policy toward Central Asia argue that the United States has historically had few interests in this region, and that developments there remain marginal to U.S. interests. They advocate limited U.S. contacts undertaken with Turkey and other friends and allies to ensure U.S. interests. Many discount fears that an anti-Western Islamic fundamentalism, such as that fostered by Iran or Afghanistan's Taliban group, will make headway, or that Russia will seek or be able to re-subjugate the region. They question whether the oil and other natural resources in these new states are vital to U.S. security and point out that oil resources are, in any event, unlikely to be fully available to Western markets for many years. Some also criticize aid for democratization among cultures they view as historically attuned to authoritarianism. Others urge reducing or cutting off most aid to repressive governments that widely violate human rights, arguing that such aid provides tacit support for these regimes, and may even unwittingly encourage the rise of Islamic fundamentalism as an alternative channel of dissent. Some point to lingering civil and ethnic instability in Tajikistan and elsewhere in the region as another reason for the United States to eschew major involvement that might place more U.S. personnel and citizens in danger.

U.S. Policy after the Soviet Collapse

After the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, the United States recognized the independence of all the former Central Asian republics and offered diplomatic relations to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, which were viewed as following responsible security and democratic policies. Citing the dangers the Central Asian states faced from Iranian-sponsored Islamic fundamentalism, U.S. diplomatic relations were quickly established with the remainder by mid-March 1992. Faced with calls in Congress and elsewhere that the Administration devise a policy on aiding the NIS, President Bush sent the Freedom Support Act to Congress, which was signed into law on October 24, 1992 (P.L. 102-511). The new Clinton Administration in 1993 pledged to focus on closer and better coordinated U.S. ties with the NIS as a top foreign policy priority. (For details on aid, see CRS Report RL30148 (pdf), U.S. Assistance to the Soviet Union and its Successor States 1991-1998).

In Congressional testimony on March 17, 1999, Ambassador-at-Large for the New Independent States Steve Sestanovich stated that the over-arching goal of U.S. policy in Central Asia is to secure the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the states, and that much progress in this regard had occurred since the Soviet Union broke up. This goal is pursued by advocating democratization (because it is "the long-term guarantor of stability and prosperity"), free markets, cooperation within the region (including on building east-west pipelines and on defense) and its integration into the Euro-Atlantic community, and responsible security policies (including nonproliferation, counter-terrorism, and counter-narcotics). Although the states may make halting progress in some areas, he stated, the Administration is committed to continue working with them. In testimony in April 1998, Ambassador Sestanovich stated that the United States has a "big stake" in assisting the peaceful and historic integration of Central Asia and the South Caucasus into the world community, interests that are "strategic" and "vital."

U.S. diplomatic and other ties have greatly increased in all the Central Asian states , and the embassies are being upgraded (except in Tajikistan, see below). A U.S.-Kazakh Joint Commission held its first meeting in November 1994, chaired by Vice President Gore and President Nazarbayev. It consists of five working groups covering trade, defense, non-proliferation, and other cooperation. Nazarbayev visited the United States on December 17-21, 1999, to co-chair the 6^th session of the Joint Commission, and met with President Clinton. The United States pledged aid for transport development, nuclear non-proliferation, defense conversion, and military cooperation. A U.S.-Uzbekistan Joint Commission, highlighting the Administration's view that "in geopolitical terms [and] commercially, [Uzbekistan] is a very important country for the United States," held its first meeting in February 1998, chaired by Ambassador Sestanovich and Uzbek Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Komilov. Another meeting in May 1999 resulted in accords on trade and energy, military cooperation, anti-terrorism, and dismantlement of an Uzbek chemical weapons facility.

Fostering Pro-western Orientations

The United States has encouraged the Central Asian states to become responsible members of the international community, and supported their admission to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), NATO bodies, and other Western organizations. The Administration has supported these integrative goals through bilateral assistance and through coordination with other aid donors, including regional powers such as Turkey. The Administration has used these and other means to supplant or discourage radical regimes, groups, and Islamic fundamentalists -- who use repression or violence to oppose democratization -- from attempts to gain influence. Upon independence, all the Central Asian states professed desires for good relations with both East and West as a means of demonstrating independence, and a certain opportunism was evident in the quest for relations with large aid donors. All the Central Asian leaders publicly embraced Islam, but displayed hostility toward Islamic fundamentalism. At the same time, they established some ties with Iran for trade and aid purposes. While the Central Asian states have had greater success in attracting development aid from the West than from the East, many observers argue that, in the long run, Central Asian foreign policy will probably not be anti-Western, but may be more oriented toward Islamic states and interests. (See also CRS Reports RL30294, Central Asia's Security; and 98-86, Iran and Central Asia.)

Russia's Role. The Clinton Administration has generally viewed a democratizing Russia as able to play a stabilizing role in Central Asia, though there has been increasing emphasis that Russia should not seek to dominate the region or exclude Western and other involvement. Some observers warn that Russia might soon reabsorb Central Asia into a new empire. Others, however, discount such capabilities because of what they view as Russia's deep economic, political, ethnic, and military disorder, but nonetheless endorse monitoring Russian actions that might infringe on the independence of the NIS.

Russian officials have variously emphasized interests in strategic security and economic ties with Central Asia, and concerns over the treatment of ethnic Russians. Strategic concerns have focused on drug trafficking and regional conflict, and the region's role as a buffer to Islamic extremism. Russia endeavors to meet its strategic concerns by concluding bilateral military arms and training, basing, and border security agreements, as well as multilateral agreements among the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), such as on Collective Security. By the late 1990s, Russia's economic crisis and demands by the Central Asian states caused it to reduce its security presence, but instability in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan and changes in Russia's political climate may be contributing to a reassessment of security ties. Russian border troops still defend "CIS borders" in Tajikistan, but were phased out in Kyrgyzstan in 1999. In May 1999, Turkmenistan ordered Russia's remaining 300 border troops to leave, and a last group of fifty Russian military officer advisors left in late 1999. In early 1999, Uzbekistan withdrew from the Collective Security Treaty, citing its ineffectiveness and obtrusiveness, though Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan reaffirmed membership. Russia has justified its military base accord with Tajikistan by citing the Islamic extremist threat to the CIS. Among recent Russian security moves in the region, in early 2000 Russia supplied Kazakhstan with Suvorov jet fighters and trainers and promised to soon deliver an S-300 anti-missile complex and Tupolev bombers. Also, Tajikistan (and Uzbekistan with caveats) in March 2000 joined Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in coordinating air defenses with Russian Air Defense Forces. In March 2000, Russia's Acting President Vladimir Putin called for the CIS to allow its special forces easy access. Reportedly, Russia's elite Alpha special forces had been sent to Armenia in October 1999, following assassinations there, without Armenia's permission. Similarly, in November 1999, Alpha forces were secretly dispatched to Georgia, before Russia vainly requested that Georgia's government permit Russian forces to attack Chechnya via its territory.

Economically, Russia seeks to counter Western business interests and gain substantial influence over oil resources in the region through participation in joint ventures and by insisting that oil pipeline routes transit Russian territory to Russian Black Sea ports (see below, Trade). At the same time, Russia has avoided large economic subsidies and obligations to the region. The safety of ethnic Russians (or more broadly, "Russian-speakers") in Central Asia has been of popular concern in Russia, but has not resulted in much real assistance by Russia, mainly serving as a political stalking horse for those in Russia advocating the "reintegration" of former "Russian lands." According to the 1989 Soviet census, nearly ten million ethnic Russians resided in Central Asia, constituting about 40% of all ethnic Russians residing outside of Russia (25.3 million). Six of the ten million reside mainly in northern and eastern regions of Kazakhstan, and many Kazakhs fear potential separatism in these regions. Ethnic Russian fears are raised by employment, language, electoral, and other policies or practices they deem discriminatory. Fears are also fed by attacks on Russians in some places. These factors, combined with others, have contributed to decreasing numbers of Russians in the region. Those remaining tend to be elderly or low-skilled. In Kazakhstan, ethnic Kazakhs have again become a majority.

While seeking ties with Russia to provide for security and economic needs, at least in the short term, the Central Asian states have tried to resist or modify Russian policies viewed as diluting their sovereignty, such as Russian calls for dual citizenship and closer CIS ties. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Russia, and Belarus belong to a customs union that has wrangled for years over tariffs. Russia criticized Kyrgyzstan's admission to the World Trade Organization in late 1998 as endangering the customs union. Uzbek President Islam Karimov and Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev have been harsh critics of what they have viewed as Russian tendencies to treat Central Asia as an "unequal partner." Some observers argue that a heavy-handed approach by Russia in pursuing interests in Central Asia, as well as damaging its ties with the West, will backfire among increasingly nationalistic populations and elites and harm its long term ties with these states.

Russia and Iran have found some common grounds for cooperation in countering what they view as adverse Western influences in Central Asia. Similarly, Russia has increased efforts to forge a "partnership" with China on Central Asia issues. China has shown increased interest in ethnic issues and with energy and other trade with the region. Some observers warn that this growing similarity of interests among Russia, Iran, and China in countering the West and attempting to increase their own influence could heighten threats to the sovereignty and independence of the Central Asian states. Others discount such threats, stressing the limited economic capabilities of the three states, their diverging interests, and Russia's weakened regional influence.

Obstacles to Peace and Independence

The United States has fostered stability necessary for the NIS to successfully implement pro-Western reforms. Deputy Secretary Talbott stated in July 1997 that U.S. support for peace settlements aims at preventing the region from becoming a hotbed of terrorism, religious and political extremism, and wider conflict. He also noted that there are substantial oil resources in the region, "yet another reason why conflict resolution must be job one for U.S. policy." However, conflict mediation and the evaluation of other threats to stability in Central Asia have not been a primary responsibility of the State Department's Special Negotiator for Nagorno Karabakh and New Independent States Regional Conflicts, though U.S. diplomacy played a role in U.N. and OSCE mediation efforts in Tajikistan.

All the Central Asian states, except Tajikistan, have been politically stable since independence, unlike many other NIS. The presidents have remained in place by orchestrating extensions of their terms and by limiting political freedoms. U.S. policy and observers warn, however, that political repression ultimately harms stability. The lack of obvious successors to the present leaders raises concern among many observers, though all the current leaders are sixty-two or younger. Kyrgyzstan's Constitutional Court in 1999 ruled that President Askar Akayev could run for a third term as president, although the constitution sets a two-term limit, and Niyazov orchestrated a constitutional change in late 1999 naming him president for life. Uzbekistan's capital of Tashkent was shaken in February 1999 by explosions that Karimov denounced as a coup attempt (see below).

Regional Tensions and Conflicts. The legacies of co-mingled ethnic groups, convoluted borders, and vague national identities pose serious problems to stability in all the Central Asian states. During the Soviet period, an overarching "Soviet" identity was stressed, but more significant was the spur, given by the delineation of republics in the 1920s-1930s, to the growth of Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Tajik, Turkmen, and Uzbek national identities. With the Soviet collapse, most in Central Asia support these national identities, but also are emphasizing identifications with clan, family, region, and Islam. Among the four Turkic-language states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan), some promote a pan-Turkic identity. Most analysts conclude, however, that in the foreseeable future the term Central Asia will denote a geographic area more than a region of shared identities and aspirations. Central Asia's borders, described as among the world's most convoluted, fail to accurately reflect ethnic distributions and are hard to police, hence contributing to potential instability. Ethnic Uzbeks make up sizeable minorities in the other Central Asian countries and Afghanistan. In Tajikistan, they make up almost a quarter of the population. More ethnic Turkmen reside in Iran and Afghanistan -- over three million -- than in Turkmenistan. Sizeable numbers of ethnic Tajiks reside in Uzbekistan, and a million or more in Afghanistan. Many Kyrgyz and Tajiks live in China's Xinjiang province. The fertile Ferghana Valley was arbitrarily divided by Stalin among Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, leaving large numbers of people outside their new "national" borders. Crisscrossing mountains thwart Tajikistan's integrity. In 1996, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, signed the "Shanghai treaty" with China pledging the sanctity and substantial demilitarization of mutual borders, and in 1997 signed a follow-on treaty demilitarizing the 4,300 mile former Soviet border with China. China has used the Shanghai treaty to pressure the Central Asian states to deter their ethnic Uighur minorities from supporting separatism in China's Xinjiang province.

The Bombings in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. After the February 16, 1999, explosions, which by various reports killed 16-28 and wounded 100-351, Uzbek officials detained dozens of suspects, including political dissidents. The first trial of 22 suspects in June 1999 resulted in six receiving the death sentence. Karimov in April 1999 stated that Mohammad Solikh (former Uzbek presidential candidate and head of the banned Erk Party) had masterminded the plot, and had been supported by the Taliban and Uzbek Islamic extremist Tohir Yuldash. The 22 suspects were described in court proceedings as Islamic terrorists who received training in Afghanistan (by the Taliban), Tajikistan, Pakistan, and Russia (by the terrorist Khattab in Chechnya), and were led by Solikh and Yuldash and his ally Jama Namanganiy. Testimony alleged that Solikh had joined the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, led by Yuldash and Namanganiy, in mid-1997, and that Solikh, Yuldash, Namanganiy, and others had agreed that Solikh would be president and Yuldash defense minister after Karimov was overthrown and a caliphate established. According to an Uzbek media report in July 1999, the coup plot included a planned attack on Uzbekistan by Namanganiy and UTO allies transiting through Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan (see below). Another secret trial in August 1999 of six suspects in the bombings (brothers of Solikh or members of his Erk Party) resulted in sentences ranging from 8 to 15 years. Solikh has rejected accusations of involvement in the bombings, alleging that court "confessions" were coerced and scripted.

The United States has supported Uzbekistan's efforts to combat terrorism, but has stressed that such efforts cannot include widespread human rights violations. The State Department on August 20, 1999, criticized the August 1999 trial as violating Uzbekistan's commitments to uphold human rights and due process. In a speech to an Uzbek audience on February 7, 2000, John Beyrle, Deputy Special Advisor to the Secretary of State for the NIS, warned that Uzbekistan's religious freedom law, "one of the most restrictive ... in the world," encouraged law-breaking, and argued that religious extremism instead should be combated by "protecting the rights and freedoms of citizens." At the OSCE Summit in November 1999, Karimov called for the creation of OSCE special forces to combat terrorism. The OSCE more generally resolved that the international community should play a role in anti-terrorism and anti-crime efforts and in bolstering security cooperation in Central Asia.

The Incursion into Kyrgyzstan. Several hundred Islamic extremists and others who fled repression in Uzbekistan and settled in Tajikistan but were being forced out at Uzbekistan's behest, and rogue groups from Tajikistan that refused to disarm as part of the Tajik peace settlement, entered Kyrgyzstan in July-August 1999. Namanganiy headed the largest guerrilla group. The guerrillas seized hostages, including four Japanese geologists, and several Kyrgyz villages, stating that they would cease hostilities if Kyrgyzstan provided a safe haven for refugees and would release hostages if Uzbekistan released jailed extremists. The guerrillas were rumored to be seeking to create an Islamic state in south Kyrgyzstan as a springboard for a jihad in Uzbekistan. Kyrgyzstan's defense minister in October 1999 announced success in forcing guerrillas out of the southwestern mountains into Tajikistan. Uzbek aircraft targeted several alleged guerrilla hideouts in Tajikistan, eliciting protests from Tajikistan of violations of its airspace. Karimov heavily criticized Akayev for supposed laxity in suppressing the guerrillas. In November 1999, the Tajik government, which has mercurial relations with Uzbekistan, incensed it by allowing the guerrillas to enter Afghanistan rather than wiping them out. Kyrgyzstan heightened its border security in early 2000 in the face of rumors that Namanganiy's forces might again attack. According to some observers, the incursion indicated both links among terrorism in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Russia (Chechnya and Dagestan), and elsewhere and the weakness of Kyrgyzstan's security forces. Observers disagreed on the degree to which this terrorism was related to Islamic fundamentalism or to control over narcotics resources and routes. All Central Asian militaries except Turkmenistan joined Russia in late 1999 and in April 2000 in "Southern Shield" military exercises in the region aimed at combating terrorist groups.

Civil War in Tajikistan. State Department officials served as observers at the U.N.-sponsored inter-Tajik peace talks, an example of the Administration's diplomatic efforts to ease ethnic and civil tensions in the NIS. The United States has been the major humanitarian and developmental aid donor to alleviate the effects of the Tajik civil war. The United States has supported the presence of U.N. observers in Tajikistan, and urged Russian-CIS "peacekeeping" forces to cooperate fully with them and to abide by international law. U.S. contributions for this U.N. observer mission were an estimated $4.6 million in FY2000, and the Administration requested $4.6 million for FY2001. U.S. programs in Tajikistan have been complicated by the U.S. closure of its embassy in Dushanbe in September 1998, and relocation of personnel to Kazakhstan, because of civil violence. In early 2000, diplomatic personnel were allowed to travel back and forth to Dushanbe. A site will be identified where a secure chancery can be built. Ambassador Sestanovich warned in March 1999 that the truncated diplomatic presence could allow Iran to increase its influence.

Tajikistan was among the Central Asian republics least prepared and inclined toward independence when the Soviet Union broke up. In September 1992, a loose coalition of nationalist, Islamic, and democratic parties and movements and largely composed of members of Pamiri and Garmi regional elites based in east and central Tajikistan -- who had long been excluded from political power -- tried to take over. Kulyabi and Khojenti regional elites, assisted by Uzbekistan and Russia, launched a successful counteroffensive that by the end of 1992 had resulted in 20,000-40,000 casualties and up to 800,000 refugees or displaced persons, about 80,000 of whom fled to Afghanistan. In 1993, the CIS authorized "peacekeeping" in Tajikistan under the auspices of its Collective Peacekeeping Forces (CPF) treaty to protect what Russia terms "CIS borders." CPF consisted of Russia's 201st Rifle Division, based in Tajikistan, and token Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Uzbek troops (the Kyrgyz and Uzbek troops pulled out in 1998-1999). Russian media reported in late 1999 that there were about 20,000 CPF, border, and other Russian troops in Tajikistan. The commander of the CPF troops in August 1999 stated that the role of his forces had largely shifted to the delivery of humanitarian cargos, clearing mines, and giving medical assistance. Nonetheless, plans to withdraw the CPF have not been announced, perhaps because in April 1999, Russia and Tajikistan signed a basing agreement for the 25-year presence of Russian troops.

After Tajik government and opposition emissaries agreed to a cease-fire in September 1994, the UNSC formally established a U.N. Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) in December 1994 with a mandate to monitor the cease-fire, later expanded to investigate cease-fire violations, monitor the demobilization of UTO fighters, assist ex-combatants to integrate into society, and offer advice for holding elections. The U.N. reported in late 1999 that UNMOT comprised 167 civilian staff and 37 military observers. In December 1996, the two sides agreed to set up a National Reconciliation Commission (NRC), an executive body composed equally of government and opposition emissaries. On June 27, 1997, Rakhmanov and UTO leader Seyed Abdullo Nuri signed the comprehensive peace agreement, under which Rakhmanov remained president but 30% of ministerial posts were allocated to the opposition and Nuri headed the NRC. Benchmarks of the peace process have been largely met, including the return of refugees, demilitarization of rebel forces, legalization of rebel parties, and the holding of presidential and legislative elections. Stability in Tajikistan remains fragile, however. An unsuccessful insurrection in the Leninabad region of northern Tajikistan launched by notorious warlord Mahmud Khudoyberdiyev in November 1998 highlights concerns by some observers about secessionist tendencies in Leninabad region and about ethnic tensions between ethnic Tajiks and Uzbeks in Tajikistan.

Democratization and Human Rights

A major concern of U.S. policy in Central Asia has been to foster the long-term development of democratic institutions and policies upholding human rights. U.S. democratization support has been provided for political parties, voter education and electoral laws, legal and constitutional reform, media, structuring the division and balance of governmental powers, and parliamentary and educational exchanges. At the same time, the United States has worked with the ex-Communist party officials who lead in Central Asia, recognizing that they may continue to hold power for some time. In testimony before the Congressional Helsinki Commission (CSCE) on May 6, 1999, State Department official Ross Wilson stressed that the Administration has "serious reservations" about calls to link U.S. aid mainly to progress in democratization. He stressed that other salient U.S. policy goals included halting proliferation and fostering free market reforms, energy development, U.S. business, and regional cooperation. In testimony on March 21, 2000, Beyrle similarly stated that, although Turkmenistan "has shown scant interest in engaging constructively on core issues of democracy, human rights, and economic reform," U.S. policy emphasizes "redemption and strategic patience," weighing human rights abuses against continued engagement on regional energy development, nonproliferation, and anti-narcotics goals and the hope that Turkmen someday might embrace democracy.

Scenarios of political development in Central Asia include continued rule in most of the states by ex-Communist party elites, gradual transitions to more nationalistic elites who are at least somewhat democratic and Western-oriented, or large-scale and perhaps violent transitions to Islamic fundamentalist or xenophobic rule. All the Central Asian governments gave assurances in 1992 to the United States that they would pursue democratization. They also pledged in joining the OSCE in early 1992 that they would abide by its principles. During Nazarbayev's 1994 U.S. visit, he and President Clinton signed a Charter on Democratic Partnership recognizing Kazakhstan's commitments to the rule of law, respect for human rights, and economic reform. However, the State Department's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1999 concludes that presidential power in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan overshadows legislative and judicial power, and that Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan have lost ground in democratization and respect for human rights. Representative Christopher Smith in October 1999 introduced H.Con.Res. 204, calling for the Central Asian states to comply with OSCE commitments on democratization and human rights. The Congressional Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe held a hearing on Uzbekistan on October 18, 1999, with chair Representative Christopher Smith terming Uzbekistan "one of the most repressive NIS," citing religious and political persecution. On February 29, 2000, Representative Dan Burton similarly called for the Administration to assist democratic media in Kazakhstan and to urge Nazarbayev to end repression and hold a national dialogue with the opposition. On March 29, 2000, Representative Phil English appeared to emphasize Kazakhstan's progress since the Soviet collapse and the importance of its friendship and energy development to U.S. interests. (See also CRS Report 98-642, Democracy-Building in the NIS.)

Recent Tajik Elections. In early September 1999, the Tajik legislature set presidential elections for November 6, 1999. Only after a popular referendum approved constitutional changes in late September, however, were the opposition Islamic Revival and Democratic parties legalized and allowed to gather 100,000 signatures to register nominees. Nominees complained that they did not have enough time to gather signatures and that Rakhmanov's appointees at the local level blocked signature-gathering. After Rakhmanov was declared the only candidate, an international outcry contributed to the hurried "registration" of one opposition candidate, who refused to run. The UTO announced an election boycott. As it became clear that Rakhmanov had out-maneuvered them, several opposition leaders such as Nuri decided to preserve working relations with Rakhmanov and to lift the boycott, while not accepting the race as fair, in exchange for Rakhmanov's promise that legislative races would be fair. Rakhmanov won the presidential race with 96.9% of 2.85 million votes cast.

Elections to the lower legislative chamber were set for February 27, 2000 (and a run-off on March 12). In all, 191 candidates contested 41 single mandate seats and 107 candidates on six party lists competed for 22 seats. Turnout was reported by the CEC at 93.23% of 2.87 million voters. In the party list voting, Rakhmanov's People's Democratic Party (PDP) won fifteen seats, the Communist Party won five seats, and the Islamic Renaissance Party won two seats. Twenty-seven single mandate seats were filled in the 1^st round, and twelve in the 2^nd. Most winners of these seats are PDP members. Over 107 U.N and OSCE observers monitored the race. They praised the "political pluralism" of the vote, since voters "were presented with a genuine and broad range of alternatives," but concluded that the electoral process must be improved "to meet the minimum democratic standards for equal, fair, free, secret, transparent, and accountable elections." They raised questions about freedom of the media, the independence of electoral commissions, the questionable de-registration of some candidates, apparently inflated turnout figures, and the transparency of vote tabulation. Thirty-three upper legislative chamber seats were filled on March 23 by indirect voting by local council assemblies and the appointment of eight members by Rakhmanov.

Recent Kazakh Elections. The OSCE reported that September 17, 1999 indirect elections to Kazakhstan's upper legislative chamber were marred by harassment of monitors and cited reports that Kazakh officials had warned local legislators not to vote for oppositionists. Elections to Kazakhstan's lower legislative chamber took place on October 10, 1999, with 547 candidates and nine parties competing for 77 seats. Runoffs were held on October 24 in most districts because no one candidate received the required majority of the vote. The OSCE concluded that the race was "a tentative step" in democratization, but decried biased local electoral commissions, unfair campaign practices by pro-government parties, and harassment of opposition candidates.

Recent Turkmen Elections. Elections to the Turkmen 50-seat legislature (Mejlis) were held on December 12, 1999. Niyazov rejected a role for parties, stating that partisanship could lead to clan rivalries. Instead, he directed that nominating groups choose "professional" candidates, and they dutifully selected two candidates per constituency to run. Prior to the race, Niyazov stepped up his repression of political and religious dissidents. The OSCE refused to send monitors, citing the government's control over the electoral process. Changes to the Constitution were introduced in late December 1999 during a joint meeting of the Mejlis, the quasi-legislative Khalk Maslakhaty, and Niyazov's National Revival Movement, to include naming Niyazov president for life. The State Department termed the life term as signaling Turkmenistan's disregard for its OSCE commitments and "a further step backward on the path toward democracy."

Recent Uzbek Elections. Elections to the Uzbek legislature (Oliy Majlis) were held on December 5, 1999. Five pro-government parties and local councils (and some initiative groups) sponsored 1242 candidates to vie for 250 seats. A 2^nd round was held on December 19 in 66 districts where no one candidate received a majority vote. The OSCE decided not to deploy observers, on December 6 reporting that deficient electoral laws precluded free and fair elections and that local officials interfered with nominations and electoral commissions. In late November 1999, two candidates were registered to run in the January 9, 2000 presidential race, incumbent President Karimov and Abdulkhafiz Jalolov. Jalolov was nominated by his People's Democratic Party (PDP), which Karimov formerly headed. Karimov won 91.9% of 12.1 million votes cast, with a 95.1% turnout. The State Department announced on January 12, 2000, that "this election was neither free nor fair and offered Uzbekistan's voters no true choice," mentioning the Uzbek government's refusal to register opposition parties or candidates and that Jalalov had endorsed Karimov during the campaign.

Recent Kyrgyz Elections. Kyrgyzstan's February 20, 2000 legislative election (with a run-off on March 12) reflected the further erosion of Kyrgyzstan's earlier signal progress in regional democratization, according to the State Department. Under new laws, fifteen seats in the upper chamber were set aside for party list voting. The Central Electoral Commission ruled that sixteen parties out of 27 legally registered were disqualified from fielding party list candidates, though it urged that such candidates could instead seek single-member seats. The major opposition Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan-Dignity Party bloc was initially registered but then de-certified. The OSCE on February 8 criticized the de-certification as a narrow interpretation of the law and as restricting popular choice in the election. In all, 545 candidates were finally permitted to run for 105 seats. Six parties received over 5% of the vote, giving them seats: the Party of Communists (5 seats), Union of Democratic Forces (4), Democratic Party of Women (2), Party of Veterans (2), My Country (1), and Ata-Meken (1). Only Ata-Meken and the Communist Party are clear opposition parties. Only three constituency races were decided in the 1^st round. In the 2^nd round on March 12, 84 members were elected in a confusing vote. Prominent opposition politician Daniyar Usenov was disqualified after the 1^st round, although he actually had won, according to the OSCE. Similarly, opposition Dignity Party head Feliks Kulov received more votes than his opponents in the 1^st round, but was heavily defeated in the 2^nd through apparent legerdemain, according to the OSCE. After the 2^nd round, the opposition Democratic Movement, Dignity Party, and the People's Party protested the results.

About 120 OSCE observers and 2,000 local observers monitored the election. In the 1^st round, OSCE monitors pointed to problems such as the disqualification of prominent opposition parties and the pro-government composition of electoral boards, and in the 2^nd round criticized continued government harassment of opposition candidates, politically motivated court decisions disqualifying some opposition candidates, and irregularities in vote-counting. State Department spokesman James Foley on March 14 stressed that "the United States is disappointed in the conduct of the 2000 parliamentary election in Kyrgyzstan," which "amounted to a clear setback for the democratic process." On March 23, he criticized Kyrgyz authorities for forcibly suppressing a peaceable demonstration and for arresting Kulov the day before on vague charges of committing crimes several years ago.

Security and Arms Control

Besides diplomatic efforts and humanitarian and reform aid, some U.S. security assistance has been provided to the region. Except for CTR, amounts have been modest, but FY2000 and proposed FY2001 funding has been increased. During Nazarbayev's 1994 U.S. visit, the two sides signed a memorandum on defense cooperation, including talks on defense doctrine, training, and budgets, and in 1997, they signed a military cooperation accord pledging U.S. training, nuclear materials security, and conversion aid. Similar military accords have been signed with Uzbekistan. In February 2000, the United States transferred sixteen military transport vehicles to the Uzbek military to enhance interoperability with NATO forces, the first sizeable military equipment to be provided under the Foreign Military Financing program to Central Asia. Coast guard vessels are being transferred to Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. U.S. Central Command in 1999 became responsible for all U.S. military engagement activities, planning, and operations in Central Asia. USCENTCOM states that its strategy focuses on PFP, Marshall Center (the defense educational coordinator for PFP), and International Military Exchanges and Training programs to foster "apolitical, professional militaries capable of responding to regional peacekeeping and humanitarian needs" in the region (see also below, Arms Control).

Efforts to foster military cooperation were furthered when all the Central Asian states except Tajikistan joined NATO's PFP by mid-1994. Central Asian officers and troops have participated in PFP exercises in the United States since 1995. Troops from Centrazbat (the Central Asian Battalion; composed of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan under U.N. auspices for potential peacekeeping) took part in "PFP-style" exercises in 1997 in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan along with 500 U.S. troops who flew directly from the United States. In 1998, Centrazbat forces took part in PFP-sponsored exercises in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, along with about 350 U.S. troops (Russian, Turkish, Azerbaijani, and Georgian forces also took part). In May 1999, USCENTCOM hosted Centrazbat training exercises "in the spirit of PFP" in Florida. U.S. troops plan to take part in Centrazbat exercises in Kazakhstan in September 2000. Many in Central Asia and elsewhere viewed these field exercises as "sending a message" to Islamic extremists and others in Afghanistan, Iran, and elsewhere against fostering instability in the region.

Weapons of Mass Destruction. Major U.S. security interests have included elimination of nuclear weapons remaining in Kazakhstan after the breakup of the Soviet Union and other efforts to control nuclear proliferation in Central Asia. In March 1999, Ambassador Sestanovich warned that Iran is targeting these countries, and that U.S. aid aims to bolster their export and physical controls over nuclear technology and materials. After the Soviet breakup, Kazakhstan was on paper one of world's major nuclear weapons powers (in reality Russia controlled these weapons). Though some in Kazakhstan urged "retaining" the weapons, it pledged to become a non-nuclear weapons state. All bombers and their air-launched cruise missiles were removed by late February 1994. On April 21, 1995, the last of about 1,040 nuclear warheads had been removed from the SS-18 missiles and transferred to Russia, and Kazakhstan's prime minister announced that it was nuclear weapons-free. The SS-18s were eliminated by late 1994 and silos were blown up in 1995-1996. Vice President Gore and Nazarbayev in December 1993 signed a U.S.-Kazakh Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) umbrella agreement for the "safe and secure" dismantling of approximately 104 SS-18s, the destruction of their silos, and related purposes.

Besides the Kazakh nuclear weapons, there are active nuclear research and power reactors, uranium mines, and milling facilities in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan that pose proliferation concerns. Kazakhstan is reported to possess one-fourth of the world's uranium reserves, and Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are among the world's top producers of yellow cake (low enriched uranium). Kazakhstan had a fast breeder reactor at its Caspian port of Aktau, the world's only nuclear desalinization facility. Shut down in April 1999, it has nearly 300 metric tons of enriched uranium and plutonium spent fuel in storage pools. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan report that their mining and milling activities have resulted in massive and hazardous waste dumps. Concerns that Iran or other terrorist states or groups might illicitly obtain nuclear materials led the United States and Kazakhstan to cooperate in 1994 to remove about 600 kg of highly enriched uranium from a poorly safeguarded Kazakh warehouse and to ship it to the United States. In 1997, U.S.-Kazakh accords were signed on peaceful nuclear energy use and on long-term storage of Aktau's nuclear materials. In December 1999, other accords were signed providing aid for mothballing the Aktau reactor and securing and eventually removing its weapons-grade plutonium.

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan hosted major chemical and biological warfare (CBW) facilities during the Soviet era. CTR and Energy Department funds are being used to eliminate infrastructure at a former biological weapons production facility in Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan, and for retraining scientists. At the U.S.-Uzbek Joint Commission meeting in May 1999, the two sides signed a CTR agreement on securing, dismantling, and decontaminating the Soviet-era Nukus chemical research facility. Other aid will help keep Uzbek weapons scientists employed in peaceful research. U.S. scientists are also examining hazards at a Soviet-era CBW testing site on an island in the Aral Sea belonging to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Western media in mid-1999 reported the discovery of live anthrax spores at the site. Uzbekistan has acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention, which bans signatories from developing, producing, stockpiling, and using chemical weapons and pledges them to destroy such weapons and production sites.

Support for Economic Reforms

Support for private sector development has been a major component of U.S. aid efforts in the NIS. Technical assistance and training programs supporting the creation of market economies have included those dealing with entrepreneurship, agribusiness, small business development, telecommunications, banking, defense conversion, tax policy, bankruptcy, and labor management. A Central Asian-American Enterprise Fund was set up in 1994, with Congressional authorizations of up to $150 million ($87 million has been appropriated through FY1998). The Fund's regional offices have disbursed $73 million in loans to over 400 small- and medium-size private enterprises. A memorandum on U.S. advice for Kazakh defense industrial conversion was signed during Nazarbayev's 1994 U.S. visit. Defense conversion aid was discussed during his 1997 and 1999 U.S. visits and during Karimov's June 1996 U.S. visit. Joint committees for defense conversion set up with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan plan U.S. aid in converting state enterprises to privately held, non-defense firms. Peace Corps volunteers, teaching small business development and English language, serve in all of the Central Asian states except Tajikistan.

The Central Asian states, the poorest part of the former Soviet Union, witnessed steep declines in gross domestic product (GDP) after they gained independence. Average per capita incomes were less than $1,500 in 1998 (World Bank). The declines in GDP appeared to reverse in the late 1990s in all the states. However, Russia's 1998 financial crisis, dipping world prices for raw materials, and poor management have led to declining exchange values of national currencies, increasing inflation, and rising budget deficits in the region. High rates of crime and corruption also threaten economic growth. The Central Asian states are unlikely to gain quick revenues from oil, gas, or other development, suggesting that they may be vulnerable to popular discontent and instability for several years. Reflecting this view, Max van der Stoel, commissioner for national minorities with the OSCE, in November 1999 argued that Islamic fundamentalism, spread by Afghan extremists, was increasing among poverty-stricken Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kazakhs, and Kyrgyz, and called on Western governments to step up their economic development aid.

Regional economic cooperation has proven elusive. A customs union was formed between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in 1994 (which Kyrgyzstan joined soon after and Tajikistan joined in 1999). Renamed the Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC) in 1998, it consists of an Interstate Council of heads of state and government, a Council of Foreign Ministers, Centrazbat, and a Central Asian Bank. The bank is undercapitalized, but Centrazbat has met with some success. Despite this CAEC, economic disputes in 1999 have included Kazakh and Uzbek restrictions on imports from Kyrgyzstan, and the repeated. Uzbek cut off of natural gas deliveries to Kyrgyzstan because of payment arrears.

Trade and Investment

As stressed by President Clinton and others, U.S. support for free market reforms directly serves U.S. national interests by opening new markets for U.S. goods and services, and sources of energy and minerals. U.S. private investment committed to Central Asia has greatly exceeded that provided to Russia or most other NIS except Azerbaijan, although the region is relatively isolated and the states lag behind Russia in accommodating commercial ties. U.S. energy companies have committed to invest billions of dollars in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. U.S. trade agreements have been signed and entered into force with all the Central Asian states. Duty free access to U.S. markets under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) is in effect for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. The Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) has obligated funds for short term insurance, loans, or guarantees for export sales of industrial and agricultural equipment and bulk agricultural commodities to all the states except Tajikistan. The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) has signed agreements with all the Central Asian states on insuring U.S. private investments overseas, and has obligated funds for financing or insurance in all the states except Tajikistan. The U.S. Commerce Department has set up a Business Development Committee with Kazakhstan to facilitate official discussions on trade and economic issues. The Foreign Commercial Service (FCS) opened offices in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in 1993, and co-located American Business Centers were opened in 1994.

Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have large oil and natural gas reserves, and the other states of the region possess potential sources of export earnings, but major investments are needed to revamp, develop, or market these resources in most cases. Uzbekistan's cotton and gold production rank among the highest in the world and much is exported. It also has moderate oil and gas reserves. Kyrgyzstan owns major gold mines and strategic mineral reserves, and is a major wool producer. Tajikistan has one of the world's largest aluminum processing plants (exporting over $300 million worth in 1999) and is a major cotton grower.

Energy Resources. According to then-Special Advisor Richard Morningstar in a speech in November 1998, U.S. policy goals regarding energy resources in the Central Asian and South Caucasian states have included supporting their sovereignty and ties to the West, supporting U.S. private investment, breaking Russia's monopoly over oil and gas transport routes by encouraging the building of pipelines that do not traverse Russia, promoting Western energy security through diversified suppliers, assisting ally Turkey, and opposing the building of pipelines that transit "energy competitor" Iran or otherwise give it undue influence over the region. At the same time, as Talbott noted in a July 1997 speech, the United States discourages a "Great Game" competition, but rather urges all states to cooperate in the exploitation of regional oil and other resources. To carry out these goals, the United States has endorsed building trans-Caucasus oil and gas pipelines to Turkey, with trans-Caspian links to Central Asia, as part of a "Eurasian Transport Corridor" plan given impetus in 1997. In 1998, a Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State for Caspian Basin Energy Diplomacy was appointed to coordinate TDA, OPIC, Eximbank and other agency programs to ensure the "development of the Caspian and open commercial access to its energy resources." The current Special Advisor is John Wolf.

The Central Asian states have been pressured by Russia to yield portions of their energy wealth to Russia, in part because Russia controls most existing pipelines to export markets. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) reports estimates of 10-17.6 billion barrels of proven oil reserves and 53-83 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in Kazakhstan, and 98-155 trillion cubic feet of proven gas reserves in Turkmenistan. Kazakhstan's Tengiz oil field began to be exploited by Chevron and Kazakhstan in a joint venture during 1993 (U.S. Mobil Oil and Russia's LUKoil later joined). Russia's restrictions on Tengiz oil exports to Europe were eased slightly in 1996 after the consortium admitted LUKoil, and after Gazprom was admitted to another consortium. The Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC; formed in 1992 but restructured in 1996) protocol grants Russian interests the largest share, 44%, with the remainder held by U.S., other Western, and Omani partners. Construction is underway on a 930-mile oil pipeline from Kazakhstan to Russia's Black Sea port of Novorossiisk, to initially carry up to one million barrels per day when operational in October 2001. This may well be the region's first new large-capacity pipeline. In 1997, China and Kazakhstan signed agreements on exploiting Kazakh oil fields and building proposed pipelines to Iran and western China (lack of financing threatens the projects).

In the late 1980s, Turkmenistan was the world's fourth largest natural gas producer. It is currently largely dependent on Russian export routes. In 1993, Russia had halted Turkmen gas exports to Western markets through its pipelines, diverting Turkmen gas to other NIS who had trouble paying for the gas. In 1997, Russia cut off these shipments because of transit fee arrears and other problems. Turkmenistan called for Russia to lower transit fees and to permit gas shipments to Europe, but Russian officials and the Gazprom natural gas firm refused. In late 1998, Turkmenistan and Ukraine acceded to Gazprom's pricing demands for piping gas to Ukraine. This arrangement ended due to payment arrears, but in late 1999, Turkmenistan agreed to export 20 billion cubic meters of its gas at concessionary rates to Russia in 2000 under an accord with Gazprom. Gazprom in early 2000 proposed boosting its purchases of Turkmen gas, but price remains an issue. Seeking alternatives, Turkmenistan in December 1997 opened a 125-mile pipeline linkage to Iran's pipeline system to export gas to northern Iran. A 1998 framework agreement (and a 1999 delivery agreement) between Turkey and Turkmenistan envisages Turkmen gas flows to Turkey when a pipeline either traversing Iran or a trans-Caspian route through Azerbaijan and Georgia is built. As per a 1996 Turkey-Iran gas purchase agreement, Iran is building a section of an Iran-Turkey gas pipeline (with an eventual link to Turkmenistan).

Perhaps marking growing dissatisfaction with Russian obstacles to energy transport, in late 1997, Aliyev, Nazarbayev, and Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze agreed to explore building an oil pipeline under the Caspian Sea to link up with the proposed pipeline to Ceyhan. In October 1998, these leaders where joined by Karimov and the Turkish president in signing the "Ankara Declaration" endorsing the Baku-Ceyhan route. Kazakh officials have emphasized that an east-west route would supplement the CPC pipeline and perhaps others. Turkmenistan signed accords with Western firms in August 1999 on developing a trans-Caspian gas pipeline. In November 1999, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, and Kazakhstan signed the "Istanbul Protocol" on construction of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline (expected to be completed in 2004 with a capacity of one million barrels per day), to boost chances for international financing. Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey also signed a framework accord on a trans-Caspian and trans-Caucasus gas pipeline (planned to be completed in 2002 with an eventual capacity of sixteen billion cubic meters per year). Attending the signings, President Clinton hailed the accords as "advanc[ing] the prosperity and security of [these states] critical to the future of the entire world." Despite his talks with Gazprom, on March 29, 2000, Niyazov reiterated his support for the trans-Caspian gas pipeline to Turkey. (See also CRS Issue Brief IB95024, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia.)

Aid Overview

Among the NIS, Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, and Georgia ranked highest in cumulative U.S. government aid obligated as of September 30, 1999, with most Central Asian states receiving much less (including food, medical, and technical aid, and aid for nuclear weapons disarmament and safeguards for Kazakhstan). Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan were exceptions, with Kazakhstan ranked fifth ($601.54 million, slightly less than aid to Georgia) and Kyrgyzstan sixth ($437.8 million). In per capita terms, Kyrgyzstan has ranked in the top five aid recipients among the NIS. Humanitarian and health care aid for Tajikistan has been a special concern since FY1994. Transport costs for Defense Department excess commodities and privately donated aid are not included in the cumulative obligations in the table, but were $156.28 million for Kazakhstan, $103.64 million for Kyrgyzstan, $32.92 million for Tajikistan, $34.28 million for Turkmenistan, and $86.91 million for Uzbekistan. Consolidated Appropriations for FY2000 (P.L. 106-113), including Foreign Operations Appropriations, includes "Silk Road Strategy Act" authorizing language calling for enhanced policy and aid to support conflict amelioration, humanitarian needs, economic development, transport and communications, border controls, democracy, and the creation of civil societies in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Besides bilateral aid, the United States contributes to international financial institutions and nongovernmental organizations that aid Central Asia. Policy issues regarding U.S. aid include whether the states are properly using it, what it should be used for, and who should receive it. (For details, see CRS Issue Brief IB95077, The Former Soviet Union and U.S. Foreign Assistance.)

Table 1. Cumulative Obligations as of September 30, 1999, the FY2000 Planning Budget, and the FY2001 Request
(million dollars)

*Includes Freedom Support Act (FSA) and non-FSA aid such as Cooperative Threat Reduction Program aid. Excludes the value of private donations and Defense Department excess commodities.

**FSA and other Function 150 resources

Sources: AID and State Department.

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