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IB10059: Zimbabwe: Current Issues Raymond W. Copson April 25, 2001 CONTENTS
Zimbabwe, a country of 12 million people in southern Africa, continues to face a serious political, economic, and social crisis; and the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) is demanding that President Mugabe resign or be impeached. The MDC won 57 seats in the 150-member parliament in June 2000 elections marked by considerable violence. Since February 2000, approximately 1,000 white-owned farms have been occupied by veterans of the independence struggle and others, and on June 2, the government announced plans for immediate seizure of 804 farms without compensation for the land. An estimated 2,600 farms have been slated for eventual takeover, and the government plans to resettle 500,000 poor farmers on the seized land. The need for greater equity in land distribution in Zimbabwe has long been recognized by aid donors and even the commercial farmers' organization. Donors have offered support for the orderly purchase of land and the creation of commercially viable small farms. Analysts are concerned that the current, seemingly chaotic process will turn much of Zimbabwe's rich agricultural endowment into a patchwork of subsistence farms. At least 30 people, including four white farmers, had been killed by the time the June elections were held. Supporters of the MDC, both black and white, were the main targets. There has been much speculation that President Robert Mugabe pushed ahead with land seizures in order to enhance the popularity of his ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party among war veterans and rural Africans before the vote. MDC president, labor-leader Morgan Tsvangirai, led a vigorous campaign, despite the violence his party faced. The MDC poses a serious challenge to ZANU-PF in part because of Zimbabwe's serious economic problems. Unemployment reportedly exceeds 50%, while at least 70% of Zimbabwe's people live in poverty. The current crisis has led to a sharp drop in tourism, and foreign exchange earnings from tobacco and other agricultural exports have fallen. Zimbabwe has undertaken a costly military deployment in Congo, contributing to the International Monetary Fund's decision to suspend balance of payments support. World Bank lending is also suspended, in part because Zimbabwe is in arrears on its repayments of past loans. The adult HIV infection rate in Zimbabwe, estimated at over 25%, is among the world's highest. The next presidential election is slated for 2002, and President Mugabe, now 77, has stated his intention to run again. He has been in office since 1980. U.S. policy-makers once saw Zimbabwe as a source of political and economic stability in southern Africa, but with failure of Zimbabwe's economic reform program and mounting unrest in the 1990s, U.S. assistance levels fell sharply. Aid now focuses on programs to strengthen democracy, raise living standards among the poor, and fight the AIDS epidemic. In 2000, the United States strongly criticized pre-election violence and intimidation in Zimbabwe, and in February 2001, the State Department condemned recent attacks on the independent press, the judiciary, and the political opposition and its supporters. On April 23, 2001, the International Bar Association (IBA) issued a report http://www.ibanet.org finding that the "rule of law in Zimbabwe is in the gravest peril" and noting "conduct committed or encouraged by Government Ministers which puts the very fabric of democracy at risk." The report, prepared by a 10-member delegation of jurists, including Maryland U.S. District Court Judge Andre Davis, affirmed land reform as "a legitimate and urgent aspiration of the people of Zimbabwe" to be attained "within the law and not outside it." The delegation blamed the "current situation of lawlessness" partly on a lack of condemnation by the President of Zimbabwe and other officials. Zimbabwe Information Minister Jonathan Moyo rejected the IBA findings, saying they merely repeated uncorroborated assertions. On April 18, President Mugabe said that he intended to run in the 2002 presidential election. Zimbabwe Foreign Minister Stan Mudenge reportedly warned on April 5 that when international sanctions are imposed, the law of survival takes over, some civil rights are suspended, rule by decree becomes the norm, and parliament is rendered irrelevant. The roots of today's Zimbabwe crisis began can be traced back to 1890, when a column of 200 white settlers belonging to Cecil Rhodes' British South Africa Company (BSAC) arrived in the heart of the territory belonging to the Shona people, known as Mashonaland. By promising that white numbers would remain small and that they were interested only in mining, the settlers had won passage into the region from Lobengula, chief of the Ndebele people, whose Matabeleland lay between Mashonaland and South Africa, But each white settler was immediately given 1,210 hectares of land (1 hectare=2.47 acres) in addition to 15 mining claims. In 1893-1894, the BSAC waged war against the Ndebele, eventually winning control of Matabeleland as well. (See U.S. Library of Congress, Zimbabwe, A Country Study, Area Handbook Series, 1982). In subsequent years, African farmers were largely confined to Native Reserves, now known as Communal Areas, where the soils were poor and rainfall scant. The Land Apportionment Act of 1930 formally set aside over half the country's total land area, including the most fertile zones, for whites; and the Land Tenure Act of 1969, allocated most remaining unreserved land to the so-called "European areas," while denying Africans any possibility of acquiring land in those areas. There had been an influx of European settlers after World War II, and by the 1960s, there were more than 200,000 whites, while Africans numbered about 7 million. Britain had permitted the white-ruled territory to become a self-governing colony, known as Southern Rhodesia, in 1923, but by the 1950s, as elsewhere in Africa, African political movements were growing stronger and pressing for independence. Britain, which had come to recognize that independence for all of its African colonies was inevitable, insisted that the white settler regime undertake political reforms that would prepare the way for eventual majority rule in Southern Rhodesia. In order to avoid this, the white settler government, led by Ian Smith of the Rhodesia Front party, issued a Unilateral Declaration of Independence from Britain in November 1965, naming the secessionist country Rhodesia. Britain imposed stringent economic sanctions against Rhodesia, and United Nations sanctions followed, but neither Britain nor other countries were prepared to intervene militarily to end the rebellion. Economic sanctions had limited impact, since Rhodesia was able to trade freely with its neighbor, white-ruled South Africa. There were outbreaks of armed African opposition to the white regime as early as 1966, but it seemed at the time that white minority rule might last indefinitely. In 1972, however, a full scale guerrilla war began as troops of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) crossed into Rhodesia from bases in parts of Mozambique that Mozambican revolutionaries had freed of Portuguese control. In 1974, African nationalist Robert Mugabe, who had been imprisoned in Rhodesia for a decade, was released; and he slipped out of the country, taking command of ZANU in 1975. Mozambique became fully independent of Portugal in 1975, strengthening ZANU's position, while to the west, guerrillas of the rival Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), based in Zambia, were also launching armed attacks into Rhodesia. ZAPU was largely an Ndebele movement, and its head, Joshua Nkomo, now deceased, was himself Ndebele. Early Congressional Involvement. During the late 1960s and in the 1970s, U.S. participation in the UN sanctions against Rhodesia became a significant issue in Congress, where some Members saw the white-ruled country as a bastion against communism. These Members were concerned that ZANU leader Mugabe identified himself as a Marxist and that ZAPU, ZANU's rival, was supported by the Soviet Union. Under the "Byrd Amendment," named for Senator Harry F. Byrd of Virginia, U.S. enforcement in the United States of the UN sanctions against Rhodesia was suspended with respect to imports of critical and strategic materials. (Section 503 of the Armed Forces Appropriation Authorization of 1971, P.L. 92-156.) These included chromium, used in the manufacture of high-quality steels, as well as titanium and nickel. In 1977, however, after a long legislative battle, the view that the Byrd amendment was damaging the United States in Africa and undermining efforts to promote democracy prevailed, and the amendment was essentially repealed. (House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Congress and Foreign Policy Series, Executive-Legislative Consultation on Foreign Policy: Sanctions Against Rhodesia, September 1982.) The Carter Administration, which came into office just before the Byrd amendment was repealed, strongly supported majority rule in Rhodesia, and backed British diplomatic efforts to bring about this result. Controversy over U.S. policy continued, but on December 21, 1979, at Lancaster House in London, a Rhodesian peace agreement was finally concluded. The agreement provided for a brief transition period under a British governor, elections under a constitution establishing a parliamentary form of government, and constitutional guarantees of minority rights. Mugabe's party, renamed as the ZANU-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), won a parliamentary majority in the election, and he was installed as Prime Minister of independent Zimbabwe on April 18, 1980. Zimbabwe in the 1980s. For much of the 1980s, Zimbabwe was regarded as something of a model to other African countries because of gains the Mugabe government made in extending education and health care services to the poor; and in providing extension services, rural roads, and clean water for impoverished farming communities. Moreover, the country enjoyed relative racial harmony, and some whites served in government, although others were embittered by the course of events and thousands left. (Today, whites number an estimated 70,000 to 80,000 out of a population of 12 million.) The difficulties Zimbabwe encountered as a "front-line state" facing white-ruled South Africa brought it sympathy and support from the international donor community. The United States provided more than $360 million in non-food economic assistance in the first decade after independence. Even in the 1980s, however, there were indications that authoritarian tendencies were emerging in Mugabe's regime. From 1983-1987, dissident activity in Matabeleland, the ZAPU stronghold, was suppressed by the North Korea-trained Fifth Brigade of the Zimbabwe army. Though little information on the conflict was provided by the government, reports indicated that thousands were killed and that government troops committed a number of atrocities. The conflict ended when Nkomo agreed to merge ZAPU with ZANU-PF, but the merger had the effect of making Zimbabwe virtually a one-party state. The constitution was changed in 1987 to create a new political system with a strong presidency, and Prime Minister Mugabe was himself inaugurated as the first president on December 31 of that year. In the later 1980s, reports and allegations of corruption appeared with increasing frequency. Zimbabwe in the 1990s. In February 1990, Nelson Mandela was freed from prison in South Africa, and Zimbabwe's large and powerful neighbor began a 4-year democratic transition. Peace and democracy in South African seemed to promise a major improvement in Zimbabwe's international situation. Meanwhile, the Zimbabwe government was developing an economic structural adjustment program aimed at strengthening the domestic economy. In July 1991, the finance minister announced plans to cut the budget deficit, reduce the size of the civil service, and end all state subsidies to state-owned corporations, including the national airline, the steel corporation, and the railways. Despite these promising domestic and international developments in the early 1990s, the political and economic difficulties that had begun to emerge in the1980s deepened severely as the decade advanced. Reports and allegations of serious corruption, some involving government ministers and Mugabe family members and others close to the president, continued to appear. In 1996, there were reports of serious improprieties in payments from the War Veterans Compensation Fund, intended to assist disabled veterans of the liberation struggle. Veterans mounted a series of protests, but these were stemmed in August 1997 when the government announced that all veterans would receive a substantial lump sum payment as well as a monthly pension and other benefits. Economists were concerned that no such expenditures had been budgeted or planned, and that the inflationary impact of the payouts would further weaken the currency. Demonstrations by students and workers against corruption and unemployment by students and workers occurred with increasing frequency in the later 1990s, and these were often harshly suppressed by the police. In December 1997, during one round of protests, trade union leader Morgan Tsvangirai was attacked in his office and beaten unconscious by unknown assailants; and in March 1998, the offices of his Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) in Bulawayo were pillaged and burned. The latter attack came after the army had been deployed to put down urban protests over rising food prices. There were other reports of political intimidation against opponents of the regime, and some accounts attributed these attacks to war veterans, whose loyalty to Mugabe had been solidified by the costly veterans benefit program. As Zimbabwe's political and economic situation deteriorated in the later 1990s, tensions between the Mugabe government and white farmers over land intensified. At the time, it was estimated that about 4,500 white-owned commercial farms were occupying about 70% of the country's most fertile land while perhaps 8 million peasant farmers were still primarily working the poorer, drier soils of the Communal Areas. Many observers argued that the white-owned farms were critical to the nation's economy, not only because of their contribution to the nation's food supply, but also because the tobacco, maize, and other crops they produced for export accounted for about 40% of export earnings. Moreover, many argued that the long-term solution to unemployment among Zimbabwe's poor lay not in land redistribution but in business and industry, including tourism. Even so, it had long been recognized by donors, and by the largely white Commercial Farmers Union, that the sharp inequity in land distribution was untenable over the long term, and programs had been developed to purchase white-owned land for resettlement by African farmers. The goal of these land reform programs was not to divide up fertile land into subsistence plots, but to create viable small farms that would continue to produce crops for the local market and for export. Some economists argued that reform of this sort could actually boost earnings in the agriculture sector, since in their view land on the large, white-owned farms tended not to be fully utilized. Others pointed out, however, that there would be added costs to reform, since the former white-owned farms would be more densely populated, creating added needs for roads, schools, clinics, and other facilities. From 1980 until 1992, a largely British-funded program financed the purchase of approximately 3 million hectares of land on a "willing seller-willing buyer" basis, and some 62,000 families were resettled. (The Economist, November 15, 1997). U.S. assistance funds during this time were used not to purchase land but to help strengthen the overall economy and assist smallholder farmers through agricultural credit programs, extension services, and training. British support for land purchases came to an end in 1992, when the Mugabe government enacted the Land Acquisition Act, amending the constitution to deprive landowners of the right to appeal government-set prices in the courts. (The Act still required fair compensation, even though the right of appeal was taken away.) The Mugabe government did compulsorily take 45 farms in 1994, and according to reports, the choicest were given not to the poor but to cabinet ministers, generals, and others well-connected in ZANU-PF. (The Economist, April 16, 1994; African Business, January 1998). Lancaster House Commitments. The land issue continued to fester, with Mugabe insisting that Britain was obligated to finance the purchase of land from whites for redistribution in part because British subjects had initially taken the land by force and in part because of commitments he felt were made at the Lancaster House negotiations in 1979. Authoritative sources on Lancaster House maintain, however, that the promise made by Britain was not a specific pledge to buy land but a more general offer to help fund agricultural development, land resettlement, and redistribution programs that might be undertaken by the new Zimbabwe government. (Henry Wiseman and Alastair Taylor, From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: the Politics of Transition, New York, International Peace Academy, 1981.) Nonetheless, Jeffrey Davidow, a U.S. diplomat who closely studied the negotiations, reports that Lord Carrington, the British mediator, did indicate that Britain "would be prepared to shoulder some of the financial burden" of compensating white farmers. (A Peace in Southern Africa: the Lancaster House Conference on Rhodesia, 1979, Boulder, Westview Press, 1979.) Davidow also reports that the Carter Administration promised assistance to Zimbabwe at Lancaster House, although the promise was "convoluted and cautious" and not linked to the purchase of white-owned land. The Administration, Davidow maintains, did not want to be accused of buying out "white landlords" on the one hand, or of "opening the U.S. treasury to land-hungry peasants" on the other. These British and U.S. promises, which Davidow describes as "undoubtedly sincere, but still vague" helped bring the talks to a successful conclusion. Forewarning of the current crisis came in October 1997, when President Mugabe told a political rally that his government had decided to take land needed for redistribution to poor African farmers from white commercial farmers without compensation. In November, the government published a list of 1,503 properties, totaling over 5 million hectares, for takeover. The government said it would pay for buildings and improvements on land taken, but not for the land itself - a responsibility that in Mugabe's view lay with Britain. "The demand and need for land by our people is now overwhelming," he had said in October, adding that "if the British government wants us to compensate its children, it must give us the money, or it does the compensation itself." (South African Press Agency Report, October 13, 1997.) President Mugabe raised the issue with British Prime Minister Tony Blair, reportedly seeking about $250 million for land acquisition, but the British replied that any acquisition program would have to be "open and transparent," while resettlement plans would have to be "economic" and benefit the poor - criteria the Mugabe proposal did not meet, in the British view. (British embassy statement in Zimbabwe, reported by the South African Press Agency, November 6, 1997.) The British government affirmed in December 1997, that it recognized the need for land reform in Zimbabwe, but that President Mugabe's approach "will damage the economy, undermine investor confidence, and do nothing to help the poor." (Foreign Office statement, December 10, 1997.) The first months of 1998 were highly confused with respect to the land issue, with the government at times seeming to step back from the threat of sweeping nationalizations and at times threatening to move ahead. In June and July, poor farmers seeking land moved onto some white-owned farms as squatters, foreshadowing the vast squatter movement of 2000. Land seizures by government did not actually occur, however, perhaps because President Mugabe had come under strong international pressure to exercise restraint. Donors and international financial institutions warned that the proposed takeover program would inflict severe economic damage by deterring investors and cutting exports. The International Monetary Fund delayed a balance of payment support disbursement expected in August primarily because of concerns over Mugabe's land policy and its effect on investment. Despite international concerns, a land reform pledging conference met in Harare in September 1998. Zimbabwe was seeking pledges sufficient to fund half of a $2.2 billion program aimed at acquiring 5 million hectares over 5 years for the resettlement of 150,000 farm families. (The Economist, September 5, 1998). In fact, no funds were actually pledged at the conference, but tensions between Zimbabwe and the donor community seemed to ease because an agreement was reached on a two-stage land reform process that would have donor support. In the 2-year Inception Phase, 1,000 poor, rural families were to be resettled on 25,000 to 40,000 hectares already owned by the government or to be acquired by the government from underutilized farms that had been offered for sale by their white owners. The Inception Phase would be followed by an Expansion Phase, whose scale and design would depend on lessons learned during the Inception Phase. A communique issued at the end of the conference promised that the program would be "implemented in a transparent, fair, and sustainable manner, with regard for the law," and Foreign Minister Stan Mudenge promised that there would be "no confiscators and no land-grabbers." (South African Press Agency, September 11, 1998.) Although the plan seemed to have the support of Mudenge and other Zimbabwe officials, President Mugabe threatened major new land seizures in November 1998 and March 1999, jeopardizing donor support. Nonetheless, the Zimbabwe government presented a detailed plan for the Inception Phase in February 1999, and in May, the World Bank pledged $5 million to assist with the resettlement of poor farmers, and several bilateral donors, including the United States, made small pledges as well. Aftermath. In subsequent months, it seemed that the land issue might recede as Zimbabwe moved forward with the donor-approved reform program. France and Japan joined other donors in offering aid to resettled farmers, and in August 1999, the IMF lifted its suspension of balance of payments support. The IMF again insisted, however, among other conditions, that land reform procedures be "fully transparent" and that fair compensation be paid to landowners. At the end of the year, Mugabe signaled the onset of new land crisis when he began to demand that changes in the constitution to be voted on in 2000 include provisions for seizing land from white farmers without compensation. In a December 21, 1999 interview, Mugabe said "Land was taken from our people during colonization without compensation, but now the British say we must pay compensation for the soil stolen from us. Where do we get the resources to pay for the land?" (Johannesburg Independent Online.) The land issue indeed figured heavily in the referendum on constitutional changes proposed by the government, which took place on February 12 and 13, 2000. The proposed changes included a provision, inserted at President Mugabe's insistence, empowering the government to acquire agricultural land compulsorily for resettlement without paying compensation. (Africa News Service, January 28, 2000.) It seemed likely that the constitutional amendments would pass, in view of the government's strong backing of the changes and its domination of the media, but in a surprise outcome, 55% of those participating voted "no." Some analysts wrote that in view of the result, President Mugabe should have recognized that his influence was waning and accepted that the time had come to retire; but instead, the referendum seemed only to energize Mugabe for a new assault on white-owned farmland. There was speculation that he was motivated in part by anger over the strong support among whites for a "no" vote and by the backing whites were giving to a new opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC, see below). Within days of the referendum, war veterans and other ZANU-PF supporters began to move on to white owned farms, and by May 2000, it was estimated that squatters were present at approximately 1,000 farms. In some instances, according to reports, the farm occupations were peaceful and farm work was allowed to continue. In other instances, however, white farmers were attacked and driven off their properties. The Zimbabwe police took no action to prevent the farm occupations, claiming that they lacked the capability to repel the squatters. Court orders requiring the squatters to leave were ignored. By early June, twenty-five people had been killed during the land occupation crisis, including four white farmers and several black farm workers; the killers seemed to target MDC supporters, both black and white. A high-level Zimbabwe delegation traveled to Britain at the end of April 2000 and was told by Foreign Secretary Robin Cook that London would provide an additional $57 million to help with land reform and other programs - and would take the lead in mobilizing additional support from the international community. But Cook insisted that no action would be taken against a background of occupations and violence, and he reaffirmed British insistence on transparency, fair compensation, good economic management, and clear benefit to the rural poor in any land reform program. (Robin Cook press conference, April 27, 2000). Mugabe's reply seemed to come on May 1, when a spokesman announced that, with parliament adjourned since April 12, the president would invoke special powers to allow the forced acquisition of white-owned land. In a May 4 speech, Mugabe said that half of the 12 million hectares he said whites owned should "come our way," and that for whites who did not cooperate, "we can assist by showing them the various ways they can leave our territory." Pre-Election Escalation. Before the June voting, President Mugabe sharply escalated the land takeover drive. On June 2, 2000 the government listed 804 large farms for swift takeover and rapid resettlement. According to reports, as many as 100,000 poor Africans would be quickly moved onto the farms, while roads, schools, clinics and other facilities would be provided later. Owners, who were granted 30 days to file legal objections, would not be compensated for the land itself but would receive compensation for improvements to the land, such as farm buildings. How the improvements would be valued, and the form and timing of this compensation, were not made clear. President Mugabe had invoked emergency powers to enable the government to take land without compensation on May 24. On June 7, 2000, President Mugabe indicated that he might extend the government takeover of white-owned farms beyond those already slated for seizure. If any white farmers were permitted to remain, he added, it would be through the "charity" of the government. Mugabe urged supporters to offer thanks to the Zimbabwe war veterans who had led the farm occupations. A fifth white farmer was killed, possibly in a robbery attempt, on June 2; and by the time the elections were held, it was estimated at least 30 people had been killed in attacks on farmers and African supporters of the opposition. *** GRAPHIC not shown here. See PDF version. *** Elections to the 150-member parliament in Zimbabwe on June 24-25, 2000 resulted in a narrow victory for the ruling ZANU-PF, which won 62 seats. The MDC took 57 seats in the high-turnout vote, so that for the first time in the country's history, there would be a strong parliamentary opposition. Thirty appointive seats under the control of President Robert Mugabe continued to give ZANU-PF firm control of parliament, although the MDC has enough votes to block constitutional amendments. Tsvangirai did not himself win a seat but announced that he would contest the 2002 presidential election. There has been much speculation that President Mugabe used the land issue as a means of influencing the outcome of the vote. Even though voters rejected compulsory land seizures in the February 2000 referendum, Mugabe accurately calculated, according to this speculation, that the confrontation with white landowners would solidify his support among the rural poor, war veterans, and others. Some believe that the land confrontation distracted attention from Zimbabwe's many other problems during the runup to the election and gave Mugabe backers a rationale for attacking white farmers and farm workers who supported the MDC. Foreign observers accept MDC allegations that the government undertook a systematic effort to prevent a free and fair election and to assure a ZANU-PF victory. Observers from the European Union and the Commonwealth of Nations refused to certify the elections as free and fair because of the violence and intimidation that preceded the voting. On May 22, 2000, the head of a delegation from the U.S.-based National Democratic Institute stated that because of a campaign of violence, intimidation, and misinformation, "the conditions for credible democratic elections do not exist in Zimbabwe at this time." ("Statement of the National Democratic Institute (NDI) Pre-Election Delegation to Zimbabwe." (Available at http://www.ndi.org.) Rallies and demonstrations by the MDC were disrupted by police and by ZANU-PF backers, including war veterans. MDC supporters were detained by police, and as noted above, several MDC members were killed by unknown assailants. Just before the vote, the Mugabe government banned NDI, the International Republican Institute, and a team of African observers sponsored by the European Union from monitoring the vote. Nonetheless, the MDC chose to remain in the race, evidently calculating that it would gain a substantial number of seats despite the violence and intimidation. This calculation proved to be accurate, as the party won overwhelmingly in Harare and other urban areas, while taking some rural seats as well. Party leader Morgan Tsvangirai maintains that the MDC would have won control of parliament had it not been for the violence, but says that the result gives the party a base for contesting the presidency in two years and the parliament once again in five. The ability to block constitutional amendments is significant, since President Mugabe has used such amendments in the past as a means of consolidating his power. Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) The MDC, founded in September 1999, poses a more serious challenge than any that ZANU-PF has faced. The party's Secretary General, Morgan Tsvangirai, is a Zimbabwe labor leader, and the party has a strong base in the country's organized labor movement. The party also seems to have backing among students and urban middle classes, who are drawn to its promises to rekindle the economy, fight corruption, and improve health care and education. In addition, the MDC supports "people driven land reform," by which it appears to mean corruption-free redistribution to genuine small farmers, with international support and compensation for farms purchased. Some foreign analysts have criticized Tsvangirai for lacking fully-developed plans and programs to achieve MDC objectives, but others note that this is understandable in view of the many pressures the party has been under. The Mugabe government portrays the MDC as an agent of white farmers and foreign supporters, particularly in Britain. On February 16, 2001, MDC leader Tsvangirai was formally charged with inciting violence because of remarks made in September 2000 warning that President Mugabe would be overthrown if he did not quit. Tsvangirai, the third MDC official to be charged with incitement, maintains that his indictment is part of a government campaign of harassment. He is scheduled to appear in court on April 30. Some analysts had expected that ZANU-PF losses in the June 2000 election would cause President Mugabe to step back from the land-takeover confrontation and seek a compromise solution. Instead, the election outcome, which Mugabe blamed on donor hostility, the western media, white farmers, churches, and others (BBC, July 22, 2000; The Guardian, July 27, 2000), seemed only to goad Mugabe into expanding the land takeovers. By early August, government officials were stating that more than 3,000 farms would be seized and that the army would be mobilized to rapidly resettle hundreds of thousands of poor families. They portrayed the expansion as an urgent response to a pressing need for land; but critics speculated that President Mugabe was again escalating the land confrontation in order to better position himself for the 2002 presidential election. In April 2001, it was estimated that 2,600 farms had been slated for takeover, and the government maintained that 70,000 families had been resettled on 3 million hectares of land. Government critics maintained that far fewer had actually been moved onto farm plots. South Africa's President Thabo Mbeki warned on October 25, 2000, that "The occupation of farms must stop. They are a violation of the rule of law." (Whether President Mbeki has spoken out strongly enough on the Zimbabwe situation, however, is a subject of much debate in South Africa.) The Zimbabwe Supreme Court ruled on November 10, 2000, that the President's land resettlement policy violated fundamental constitutional rights, but the government vowed to proceed with the takeovers. On December 14, 2000, President Mugabe told a ZANU-PF Congress that "Our party must continue to strike fear in the heart of the white man, our real enemy," and vowed to continue with land takeovers regardless of any court decisions. The congress endorsed Mugabe as ZANU-PF leader, and internal critics of the president were dropped from leadership positions. The Supreme Court ruled against "fast track" land takeovers on December 21, 2000, increasing tensions between the court and the Mugabe government. On March 2, 2001, the Chief Justice of the Zimbabwe Supreme Court, Anthony Gubbay, agreed to go on immediate leave and to retire July 1, following intense government pressure for his resignation. Gubbay had reportedly received a number of death threats. As the Zimbabwe parliament headed toward adjournment in early April 2000, the ZANU-PF majority passed two bills that were viewed as aimed at further strengthening the party's position prior to the 2002 presidential vote. One provision entrenched the government's monopoly over broadcasting, which was expected to prevent a repeat of an attempt by an independent broadcaster to launch a radio station in 2000. Another bill prohibits foreign contributions to political parties. Zimbabwe has great economic potential in view of its rich endowment of land, mineral wealth, tourism potential, and relatively high standards of education. However, the economy has performed poorly for years. GNP per capita, for example, which stood at $520 in 1999, had declined by an average of .2% per year over the previous decade. (World Bank data) The economic situation has deteriorated at an accelerated pace since the land crises began in 1997, when GDP grew by 2.5%. The growth rate fell to 1.5% in 1998, stood at zero in 1999, and fell by 3% in 2000 according to government estimates. (Some believe the decline was larger.) The unemployment rate is estimated at 50%, and between 70% and 80% of the population reportedly lives in poverty. (Financial Gazette, Harare, May 18, 2000; Reuters report, June 7, 2000.) High rates of inflation and high interest rates inhibit investment. Disbursements of World Bank loans have been suspended in part because Zimbabwe's repayments are overdue, and IMF lending is also suspended, reflecting IMF concerns over Zimbabwe's economic policies. Zimbabwe owed $4.6 billion to foreign lenders at the end of 1999, a year when the country's GDP totaled just $5.6 billion. (See text box, Zimbabwe in Brief, above.) Foreign exchange is in very short supply, and because of this Zimbabwe suffers a severe shortage of fuels, which must be imported. The shortage of hard currency seems certain to continue, since the output of tobacco, the principal foreign exchange earner, is dropping due to the crisis on the farms. Tourism, an important source of revenue, has plummeted as images of conflict and confrontation in Zimbabwe have been broadcast around the world. Food shortages are now feared, because many of the farms taken over by squatters were growing produce and maize, the staple of the Zimbabwe diet, for local consumption. There is also fear of a bank crisis in Zimbabwe, since owners of occupied farms will probably not be able to repay their crop loans and mortgages. Meanwhile, farmers with uncertain title to land are having difficulty obtaining bank loans for planting or equipment purchases. The Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries estimates that 400 businesses closed in 2000, with the loss of 10,000 jobs. President Mugabe blames the closures on a campaign by local whites to damage the economy in protest to the land takeovers. (BBC, April 18, 2001.) Analysts typically blame the economic policies of the Mugabe government, and its failure to carry through with the reforms promised in 1991, for Zimbabwe's economic difficulties. High government spending, such as the 70% to 90% pay raises Mugabe granted civil servants and the military on the eve of the February constitutional referendum (Financial Times, London, January 20, 2000) comes in for particular criticism. State-owned corporations, such as the national oil company and the national electricity supplier, typically operate at losses, and this adds to the budget deficit. President Mugabe, on the other hand, blames donor-imposed economic reform programs for the country's economic difficulties, arguing that they deprived the government of the ability to influence the economy and mainly benefitted external interests together with local white-owned companies. (Speech to the Special People's Congress, December 14, 2000.) In a November 16, 2000 budget message to parliament, Finance Minister Simba Makoni, regarded as a pragmatist, painted a grim economic picture, predicting continued high inflation, rising domestic government debt, and continued arrearages on foreign debt. He called for a reduction in defense spending but acknowledged that this hinged on progress in implementing the peace accord in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (see next section). Violent riots over rising food prices had shaken Harare, the capital, and the eastern town of Mutare in mid-October. Makoni had launched a 24% currency devaluation in August 2000, but tobacco farmers and other exporters maintain that their sales will be hurt unless there is another major devaluation in the near future. On April 19, 2001, the government announced that it would begin to subsidize gold mining companies facing falling prices and rising production costs. Zimbabwe's deployment of 10,000 or more troops to support the government of President Laurent Kabila in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is often cited as a particularly costly drain on Zimbabwe's resources. Finance Minister Makoni told parliament on August 30, 2000, that the war in Congo had cost the government $200 million over two years. (Other estimates are considerably higher. BBC report, January 20, 2000.) Makoni warned that Zimbabwe's economy could not withstand this level of expenditure and said the government was committed to bringing the troops home "at the earliest opportunity." Some reports have claimed that a few well-connected Zimbabwe business people, and perhaps elements of the military, are enriching themselves through the Congo war. ("Ruthless Backers for Congo Diamond Mine," Financial Times, London, May 27, 2000.) President Mugabe and other Zimbabwe officials explain the Congo deployment as a contribution to regional peacekeeping and stability and maintain that Zimbabwe's troops will leave once a United Nations peacekeeping force is deployed. As the Congo peace process began to move forward in the first months of 2001, some Zimbabwe troops returned home; but the Mugabe government remains heavily committed in support of the Congo government. (On the Congo conflict, see CRS Issue Brief IB96037, Congo (Formerly Zaire).) HIV/AIDS Zimbabwe, according to United Nations data, has the third highest HIV infection rate in the world, with more than 25% of working-age adults testing positive for the virus. (See CRS Issue Brief IB10050, AIDS in Africa). Life expectancy is expected to fall to 39 years by 2010, whereas it would have been 70 without AIDS. In Harare, the capital, 240 of the 340 people who die each day die of AIDS-related diseases, according to government data, while the number of AIDS orphans nationwide has reached 600,000. (The Independent, London, February 10, 2000). Widespread illness is reported in the communal areas, where many households are headed by children or the elderly. President Mugabe, in public speeches and interviews, acknowledges HIV/AIDS as one of the challenges Zimbabwe faces, among other challenges, but he seems to have given land, the Congo intervention, and other issues higher priorities on his policy agenda. In January 2000, the government introduced a special payroll tax known as the "AIDS levy" to fund AIDS programs. Labor unions and others strenuously opposed the levy, charging that the funds would likely be diverted to some other purpose, and by May 2000, AIDS activists were protesting what they maintained was a large discrepancy between the amount raised through the levy and the amount actually going to AIDS projects. In July, however, the chairman of the AIDS Levy Fund claimed that the fund was benefitting millions. President Mugabe has long blamed many of Zimbabwe's problems, most notably the inequity in the distribution of land, on Britain; but his relations with the government of Prime Minister Tony Blair are particularly poor. Mugabe is angry with the Blair government for its refusal to offer unconditional financing for his land redistribution program, but he has also launched a number of personal verbal attacks against Blair and members of his cabinet. These seem to stem in part from an incident in November 1999, when British gay activists attempted a citizens arrest of Mugabe, who was visiting London. Mugabe, who is outspokenly anti-gay, was deeply outraged and blamed the Blair government for failing to prevent the attack. War veterans leader Chenjerai Hunzvi, a major force in the farm occupations, has also been highly critical of the British. Comments by Hunzvi and Mugabe - and in a government-owned newspaper - have raised the possibility that British passport holders and those eligible for British passports may be expelled from Zimbabwe. Britain has made arrangements to receive as many as 20,000 refugees from Zimbabwe if necessary, but the number eligible for British passports may be significantly larger, since Britain grants this right to people whose parents or grandparents were U.K. citizens. U.S. policymakers once saw Zimbabwe as a source of stability in southern Africa, as a valued contributor to regional peacekeeping, and as an emerging customer for U.S. exports. (See, for example, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Congressional Presentation statements on Zimbabwe, FY1997 and FY1998, as well as earlier presentations.) It was already clear in the later 1990s, however, that concerns over Zimbabwe's slow progress in economic reform, and over the political situation, were increasing. U.S. assistance to Zimbabwe, which exceeded $32 million in FY1995, dropped substantially in the second half of the decade (see Table 1).U.S. officials have been highly critical of the land takeovers and political violence in Zimbabwe. On April 6, 2000, the State Department spokesman condemned "the violent attacks in Zimbabwe on farms and against legal and peaceful demonstrations." In addition, he announced that $1 million in technical assistance the United States had committed to support resettlement planning in Zimbabwe would not be provided. On May 9, 2000, then Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, who was visiting the region, said that the United States was willing to help Zimbabwe "achieve meaningful land reform," but would not do so in a "climate of violence, lawlessness, and intimidation." He added that events in Zimbabwe were "tarnishing southern Africa's well-deserved reputation for building civil society, respecting human rights, and establishing the rule of law." (Reuters report, May 9, 2000.) Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Zimbabwe
Source: USAID. DA=Development Assistance, ESF=Economic Support Fund, IMET=International Military Education and Training. For more information, see CRS Issue Brief IB95052, Africa: U.S. Foreign Assistance Issues. Nonetheless, the Clinton Administration refrained from cutting off all aid to Zimbabwe, reportedly in part because assistance is going not to the Zimbabwe government but to programs and non-governmental organizations seeking to strengthen democracy, raise living standards among the poor, and fight the AIDS epidemic. Moreover, there was concern that stronger U.S. action against Zimbabwe would help Mugabe in his attempts to blame his country's problems on foreign scapegoats. Speaking on June 27, 2000, the State Department spokesman, although continuing to criticize the violence and intimidation that preceded the election, was cautiously optimistic about Zimbabwe's future. According to the spokesman, the United States congratulated "the people of Zimbabwe who, in spite of the reprehensible violence and intimidation that took place, turned out in record numbers and are giving Zimbabwe now a chance to move beyond the polarizing politics of the very recent past; and they bravely exercised their democratic rights. And we're calling upon all of them to work together now to move forward for Zimbabwe's future." The Department of State issued a statement on September 18, 2000, expressing U.S. concern over events in Zimbabwe "which constitute government harassment of a legitimate opposition party." The Department noted that on September 14 and 15, Zimbabwe police had "searched offices of the Movement for Democratic Change, read party documents, and detained party officials." The Zimbabwe government charged on September 19 that the MDC itself had been responsible for a bombing at MDC headquarters on September 11 - a charge MDC leaders firmly rejected. In June 2000, the Senate passed S. 2677, the Zimbabwe Democracy Act of 2000, which criticized the government of Zimbabwe and ZANU-PF for pre-election violence and imposed certain sanctions. The bill, which was not taken up by the House, was heavily criticized by Zimbabwe officials - indeed, Foreign Minister Mudenge called it an attempt to "recolonize" Africa (Africa News, August 4, 2000) that might require emergency measures in response. Supporters of the legislation argued that enactment would have sent a clear message to President Mugabe and the people of Zimbabwe with respect to the U.S. position on democracy, the rule of law, and the need for a sound economic policy. The Department of State's 2000 human rights report on Zimbabwe, released in February 2001, stated that "The Government's poor human rights record worsened significantly during the year, and it committed serious abuses. The Government provided logistical and material support to ZANU-PF members, who orchestrated a campaign of political violence and intimidation that claimed the lives of more than 31 persons. Government supporters and war veterans, with material support from the Government, occupied commercial farms, and in some cases killed, tortured, beat, abused, and threatened farm owners and other persons believed to be sympathetic to the opposition. Security forces tortured, beat, and otherwise abused persons." On February 16, 2001, the U.S. Department of State issued a press statement condemning "the recent attacks on the independent press, the judiciary, and the political opposition and its supporters in Zimbabwe." According to the statement, the United States was consulting with other countries on ways to promote the rule of law and respect for human rights in Zimbabwe. S. 494 (Frist) Return to CONTENTS section of this Issue Brief. |
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